Sunday, January 20, 2013

ANS -- Can the Occupy Movement and Organized Labor Strengthen Ties in 2013?

Occupy is alive and well.  Watch them, or join them.  this is powerful stuff.  note the poem in the comments.
Find it here:  http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/441-occupy/15619-can-the-occupy-movement-and-organized-labor-strengthen-ties-in-2013   
--Kim



Members of labor unions and others join Occupy Wall Street duri  
Members of labor unions and others join Occupy Wall Street during a march in Lower Manhattan as they arrive near Zuccotti Park in New York, 10/05/12. (photo: Craig Ruttle/AP)

go to original article


Can the Occupy Movement and Organized Labor Strengthen Ties in 2013?

By Peter Rugh, Occupy

19 January 13

 

[] n a cold December morning, before sunrise in New York's Chinatown, about 60 activists gathered in front of Dunkin' Donuts along Canal Street. Gripping steamy styrofoam cups of joe, they stepped on to several chartered buses leaving for the port of Elizabeth, New Jersey. They had an appointment with a ship soon to arrive that, as they saw it, had blood on its cargo: apparel produced in Bangladesh, destined for the shelves of Walmart.

One hundred and twelve sweatshop workers in Dhaka, Bangladesh, burned to death on November 24 at the Tazreen Fashion Factory, laboring to ensure that the mega-retailer was fully stocked ahead of America's busiest shopping season. They were paid $37 dollars a month and gave their lives so that Walmart and other U.S. corporations can maintain a competitive edge in the global market place. Occupiers and labor activists who assembled that day aimed to block Walmart - symbolically and physically - from profiting off the deaths of the workers.

As the fleet of buses sped under the Holland Tunnel, an unmarked police car followed close behind. Detective Sergeant Bob Zukowski greeted the protesters when they arrived at the Jersey docks, asking activists what they planned to do on Port Authority property. Organizers made no secret of their plans. They came to the docks to establish a community picket so that workers with the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) would see it, honor it and walk off the job, refusing to unload the Maersk-Carolina.

The attempted blockade wasn't happening in a vacuum. That day, The New York Times detailed widespread instances of bribery by executives with Walmart Mexico who used millions of dollars to skirt labor and environmental protections. A month prior, on the busiest shopping day of the year, picket-lines encircled Walmarts across the U.S as workers and supporters demanded full-time hours and higher pay. So on that December morning in New Jersey, activists had reason to believe a community picket might encourage workers to join them - a tactic that was applied successfully on the West Coast in the past.

But the East and West Coast dockworkers belong to two different unions, each with very distinct traditions. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) inherited a spirit of militant social justice unionism from its founder, the communist Harry Bridges.

Bridges' legacy could be seen alive and well when, at the height of Occupy fever in the fall of 2011, ILWU members walked off the docks of Oakland in solidarity with an Occupy picket as part of a call for a general strike on Nov. 2. The ILWU again refused to unload ships a little over a month later, responding to an Occupy call to shut down West Coast ports.

But the ILA has been riddled with mob intrigue, a legacy it has just begun to shake itself free of in recent years. The union has followed a national trend toward business unionism, which tends to see the relationship between bosses and workers as collaborative, not as that of competing class interests - or in Occupy parlance, 1% versus the 99%.

I asked Sergeant Zukowski if it was normal for Port Authority police to trail demonstrators ahead of protests. Zukowski responded: "It's not very normal to have a demonstration here."

Labor's New Front-Line

That could start to change. Backed against the wall in recent contract negotiations with the US Maritime Alliance (USMX), the ILA has threatened to strike. Picket lines could start popping up at ports from Maine to Texas on January 28. USMX has sought concessions from the union including reductions in hiring and healthcare payments, along with a slicing of the royalties workers receive on the cargo they handle.

The strike threat comes as unions across the country are being urged to swallow concessions. Meanwhile, wages for both organized and non-organized labor have stagnated since Wall Street financiers crashed the economy in 2008, intensifying a four-decade earnings decline.

The possible strike also arises at a moment of increased militancy among rank-and-file workers inspired by the Occupy movement, which shifted the national debate on to economic inequality.

"Labor has been very isolated, very under attack," said Jackie DiSalvo, a member of the teachers union at the City University of New York. She has worked as a bridge between unions and the Occupy movement, and says that in all her years as an activist, "OWS is virtually the first mass movement to aggressively say that unions are a good thing."

One of the first struggles Occupy put its energy behind was the battle for the Teamsters Local 814, who were locked out of Sotheby's, to win a contract. Over a 10-month period, Occupy staged actions that both disrupted business at Sotheby's and called attention to the art-handler employees' plight. Hundreds rallied in the workers' defense, as activists infiltrated and disrupted auctions and, in one instance, blockaded Sotheby's doors using bike locks.

The spectacle of men in tuxedos and women in fur coats confronted by militant trade unionists in Teamster jackets holding Occupy banners at the doors of Sotheby's highlighted the deep class divide that continues to be a central impetus behind the movement. After those 10 months of protest, the Teamsters Local 814 were back on the job - with a raise.

With its emphasis on direct democracy, spontaneity and flexibility of tactics - and unbounded by union hierarchies or legal impediments such as the Taft-Hartley Act - Occupy has infused the labor movement with a fresh dose of radicalism.

"If the workers at Sotheby's had gone into the auctions, their picket-line would have been declared illegal," said DiSalvo. Labor has tolerated and not been able to overturn tremendous legal restrictions on what they can do. We're not covered by those labor laws. People can get arrested. A union leader gets arrested, the union gets fined. We can be the front lines."

Occupy has also leaned on labor at times. On Oct. 14, 2011, Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Brookfield Properties - deed holders to the "privately-owned public space" where Occupy Wall Street pitched its tents - attempted to clean the Financial District of protest. The night before, AFL-CIO affiliates in New York City sent a mass mailing to their members, urging them to turn out and defend the encampment. Thousands mobilized in the early hours to help Occupy stave off eviction. The next day, media coverage of the movement started to take a different bent. "You can't say these are a bunch of wacko, slacker hippies if you've got the labor movement there," said DiSalvo.

Back to the Basics

But organized labor and Occupy haven't always seen eye-to-eye.

In January of last year, a meeting meant to help forge a united front between Occupy and ILWU members in the Pacific Northwest ended in a brawl. In a statement that month, members of Occupy Seattle wrote that they stood in solidarity with the ILWU's locked-out Local 21, but seemed to exclude them from the movement. Citing the Dec. 12 shutdown of Oakland docks, the authors wrote that Occupy "has become a new type of movement of unemployed, low waged, and casualized workers both in the workplace and outside of it. We are the 89% of the U.S. working class that is not unionized." The statement went on to call for moving "beyond the limits of traditional labor struggle."

"Who shut down the docks in Oakland?" asked Occupy participant and longtime union activist Amy Muldoon. "I see it as the product of collaboration, whereas people who are more dismissive of the possibilities of organized labor right now think it was purely coming from the outside. They think they can gum up the works while not actually being part of the production, transportation, distribution or sales process." To reorganize society based on "mass mutual aid," Muldoon added, the change has to come from within the communities being affected.

Muldoon cautions against confusing the bureaucratic, top down labor structures of today with the ways things always were, or how they will be in the future. "The labor movement has itself been historically flexible and encompassed a number of things that the occupation of Zuccotti Park also encompassed. In the 1934 Teamster strike in Minneapolis, there was a commissary. There were medics. There was volunteer childcare. There were a number of things that sprang up out of the needs of self organization of collective struggle."

And in this sense, she said, Occupy wasn't so much something new as it was a return to the basics. While expectations about the Occupy movement working successfully with organized labor may have been too high too early, OWS had a visible impact - and will continue to be a part of the fabric of the labor movement going forward, she said.

Ironically, the precariat workforce alluded to by members of Occupy Seattle last year has undergone an upsurge of activity in New York City in recent months, with grocery workers, carwashers, airport security personnel and employees within the fast food industry all seeking to unionize. Sometimes they've worked in collusion with Occupy, while other times job actions have been sponsored by the Service Employees International Union and others.

"Those people within labor who wanted to be more militant have been able to express that," added DiSalvo. "They had been trying for years to get people to talk about growing inequality with the 1% and they had gotten nowhere. The press ignored them. Then all of a sudden, Occupy made this breakthrough."

The "Inherent Power" of the Global 99%

On the New Jersey docks in December, OWS labor activists were hoping for such a breakthrough with ILA members. But several dozen Port Authority police turned up to ensure that that didn't happen. The community picket was squeezed far away from the sight of dock workers.

Instead, activists mic-checked a letter sent from the Bangladeshi Center of Workers Solidarity, thanking them for helping to ensure that the workers who died at the Tazreen sweatshop were not forgotten. Disrupting the movement of goods, said their allies in Dhaka, "will further prove workers' inherent power within the supply chain." They added: "In acting in solidarity, you are showing the potential of this power to work across the world and confirming that we are all in this fight together."

That potential power may further be unleashed if the ILA makes good on its threat to strike in the weeks ahead, putting a brake on the machinery moving global capital. We just had the year of Occupy. Now, it's time for the year of the blockade.
 

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[]
+11 # MainStreetMentor 2013-01-19 15:35
Then … Is it Lost?©


The traveler reeked of weariness,
His companion was Fatigue
Wear upon his clothes suggest
He'd come a million league.

Gaunt were eyes deep set and brown
Above his cheekbones high
His being was pure somnolence
And I heard his silent cry.

Hard roads had been his travel
The pains chiseled on his face
In lines of furrows on his brow
Permanently enlaced

Around I saw no motion there, then …
His head began to rise
Finally he looked at me …
Suffering in his eyes.

So quietly I attended
And with a heavy heart
I wanted so to speak to him …
But knew not how to start

Within his labored breathing
He then began to speak
His words, when finally spoken
Were truthful and unique

His lips began to form the words …
Then said; "My name is: Union Man,
I'm a father; I've worked hard;
… always done the best I can."

"The road's become uphill and steep with
Burdens I can't propel
I've tried to move on and forward …
But, was struck here … and I fell.

"There are others on me
Who so do depend
I must keep moving forward,
This mustn't be my end.

"Now I must reach out to you
Together we've never failed
I'm turning now to you
'Fore on hardships I'm impaled".

A calloused hand then extended
Toward my outstretched hand
And I want to heed the call
For this Union Man

But, Greed and Avarice have won
And assistance can't be lent …
Wall Street, you see, owns me now:
I'm Your Government.
 
 
[]
+10 # Michael_K 2013-01-19 16:17
Unless the protest movements merge and their strategic thinkers mesh with each other, like a kind of Solidarnosc, this country's cooked.

In Poland, Solidarity/Soli darnosc was fighting a fading totalitarian regime, in the US, Occupy and the unions will be fighting a budding totalitarian regime. Therein lies the only real difference.
 

Saturday, January 19, 2013

ANS -- On the Second Amendment

If you are interested in following all the arguments on guns and gun control, here is a good summary of the history and what it originally meant, for some background. 
Find it here: http://kohenari.net/post/40846381732/second-amendment-founders 
--Kim


Running Chicken
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>
January 18, 2013

With all of the discussion yesterday (and in the past few weeks

With all of the discussion yesterday (and in the past few weeks) about the Second Amendment and the Founders' intentions, I thought it might be worth considering whether it's really so clear that the Founders wrote up the Second Amendment as a bulwark against the tyranny of the government they'd just created.

In an earlier post about gun control, I said that I wasn't particularly interested in hearing from people who think the Second Amendment is designed to protect us from governmental tyranny (because I'd heard all about it already and don't find the logic particularly compelling). I repeated this in my reply to critics yesterday but I might also have discussed why I don't think it's compelling to believe that the Second Amendment enshrines some sort of right to armed insurrection.

Most people, most of the time, focus on one part of the Second Amendment:

"The right of the people … shall not be infringed."

This leads people to believe that the only thing that matters is the right of the people to keep and bear arms, which leads to the notion that the Founders feared nothing so much as a government that wasn't itself perpetually afraid of the weapons to which the citizens were constitutionally entitled.

But there are alternative explanations, which stem from reading the whole Second Amendment (rather than just the nice part that talks about possessing weapons) and they cast the Second Amendment in a very different light.

Here's Saul Cornell, who holds an endowed chair in American History at Fordham University:

In 1776, most of the original state constitutions did not even include an arms-bearing provision. The few states that did usually also included a clause protecting the right not to bear arms. Why? Because, in contrast to other cherished rights such as freedom of speech or religion, the state could not compel you to speak or pray. It could force you to bear arms.

The founders had a simple reason for curbing this right: Quakers and other religious pacifists were opposed to bearing arms, and wished to be exempt from an obligation that could be made incumbent on all male citizens at the time.

When the Second Amendment is discussed today, we tend to think of those "militias" as just a bunch of ordinary guys with guns, empowering themselves to resist authority when and if necessary. Nothing could be further from the founders' vision.

Militias were tightly controlled organizations legally defined and regulated by the individual colonies before the Revolution and, after independence, by the individual states. Militia laws ran on for pages and were some of the lengthiest pieces of legislation in the statute books. States kept track of who had guns, had the right to inspect them in private homes and could fine citizens for failing to report to a muster.

Also important to consider is the fact that taking up arms against the government is specifically considered treason in Article 3, Section 3 of the Constitution:

The founders had a word for a bunch of farmers marching with guns without government sanction: a mob. One of the reasons we have a Constitution is the founders were worried about the danger posed by individuals acting like a militia without legal authority. This was precisely what happened during Shays' Rebellion, an insurrection in western Massachusetts that persuaded many Americans that we needed a stronger central government to avert anarchy.

Many people think that we have the Second Amendment so that we can take up arms against the government if it overreaches its authority. If that interpretation were correct, it would mean that the Second Amendment had repealed the Constitution's treason clause, which defines this crime as taking up arms against the government. In reality, in the first decade after the Constitution, the government put down several rebellions similar to Shays - and nobody claimed that they were merely asserting their Second Amendment rights.

So what happened?

In 2008, a closely divided Supreme Court abandoned more than 70 years of precedent and for the first time in American history affirmed that the Second Amendment is about a right to have a handgun in the home for self-defense. Lost in most of the commentary then and now is that this is almost the exactly opposite of what James Madison, the primary architect of the amendment, intended, and is hard to reconcile with the way most ordinary Americans would have read it in 1791.

There's also little chestnut, from Thom Hartmann:

The real reason the Second Amendment was ratified, and why it says "State" instead of "Country" (the Framers knew the difference - see the 10th Amendment), was to preserve the slave patrol militias in the southern states, which was necessary to get Virginia's vote ….

[…]

At the ratifying convention in Virginia in 1788, [Patrick] Henry laid it out:
"Let me here call your attention to that part [Article 1, Section 8 of the proposed Constitution] which gives the Congress power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States… .

"By this, sir, you see that their control over our last and best defence is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless: the states can do neither … this power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers over men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this pretended little remains of power left to the states may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory."

George Mason expressed a similar fear:

"The militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless, by disarming them. Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them [under this proposed Constitution] … "

Henry then bluntly laid it out:

"If the country be invaded, a state may go to war, but cannot suppress [slave] insurrections [under this new Constitution]. If there should happen an insurrection of slaves, the country cannot be said to be invaded. They cannot, therefore, suppress it without the interposition of Congress … . Congress, and Congress only [under this new Constitution], can call forth the militia."

And why was that such a concern for Patrick Henry?
"In this state," he said, "there are two hundred and thirty-six thousand blacks, and there are many in several other states. But there are few or none in the Northern States… . May Congress not say, that every black man must fight? Did we not see a little of this last war? We were not so hard pushed as to make emancipation general; but acts of Assembly passed that every slave who would go to the army should be free."

Patrick Henry was also convinced that the power over the various state militias given the federal government in the new Constitution could be used to strip the slave states of their slave-patrol militias.  He knew the majority attitude in the North opposed slavery, and he worried they'd use the Constitution to free the South's slaves (a process then called "Manumission").

[…]

[Madison's] first draft for what became the Second Amendment had said: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country [emphasis mine]: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person."

But Henry, Mason and others wanted southern states to preserve their slave-patrol militias independent of the federal government.  So Madison changed the word "country" to the word "state," and redrafted the Second Amendment into today's form.

HT: Brandon Locke.

ANS -- The More You Love Quinoa, The More You Hate Bolivians

the title of this article is a bit sensationalistic, but it's an interesting and recurring problem.  What is the solution? Fairly short article.
Find it here:  http://www.care2.com/causes/huge-quinoa-sales-bring-poverty-to-peru-bolivia.html   
--Kim


The More You Love Quinoa, The More You Hate Bolivians

The More You Love Quinoa, The More You Hate Bolivians  

get causes updates

Quinoa, once familiar only to hard-core vegans, has become so popular that the United Nations has made 2013 The Year of Quinoa.

Pronounced keen-wa, quinoa has an ancient origin, in the Andes Mountains of South America, where it was one of the three staple foods of the Inca civilization, along with corn and potatoes. The Incas called it �the mother grain,� and today the quinoa seed is considered a super-food, valued for its high protein content, fiber, essential amino acids and overall great nutritional value.

You can eat it as a side dish or a main dish for lunch or dinner, have it for breakfast in place of oatmeal, bake cookies with it, or even use it in drinks. It�s light, tasty, and easy to digest and tastes great!

For all these reasons, sales of quinoa have exploded, and this increased demand means that the basic price of this seed has tripled since 2006, while the more unusual black, red and �royal� types come at an even greater cost.

But there�s a dark side to this popularity. From The Guardian:

There is an unpalatable truth to face for those of us with a bag of quinoa in the larder. The appetite of countries such as ours for this grain has pushed up prices to such an extent that poorer people in Peru and Bolivia, for whom it was once a nourishing staple food, can no longer afford to eat it. Imported junk food is cheaper. In Lima, quinoa now costs more than chicken. Outside the cities, and fuelled by overseas demand, the pressure is on to turn land that once produced a portfolio of diverse crops into quinoa monoculture.

The idea that it�s cheaper to buy imported junk food in Bolivia and Peru than to purchase a pound of healthy quinoa is a frightening one. In the U.S., there are numerous studies showing how eating junk food contributes to our soaring obesity rates. And as American junk food spreads to other countries, with McDonalds, Burger King and Pizza Hut, among others, opening up franchises in Vietnam, China and Japan, so the obesity rates start growing there too. In El Salvador, there�s been a dramatic increase in rotten teeth, the result of an influx of American soft drinks.

That�s one disastrous aspect of this situation.

Another is the notion that with all our well-intentioned nutritious eating habits, by consuming so much quinoa, we are driving up poverty rates in Bolivia and Peru.

The Guardian article goes on to compare quinoa to other imported produce such as asparagus and soy, and reports that in both cases, increased exportation of these foods has led to environmental destruction and poverty in parts of South America.

Should we all cut back on our consumption of quinoa to stabilize the market and make sure it�s available to everyone at a fair price? Will that solve the problem?

Obviously, it�s not as simple as that. If we all stop buying quinoa, then farmers in Bolivia and Peru will lose their jobs, and they won�t have money to buy any quinoa. A better solution is to begin growing quinoa in other parts of the world.

Every crop originally came from a specific place, so quinoa production will spread, given demand, as has the production of corn and potatoes, the two other staples of the Inca diet.

What do you think?

Related Care2 Coverage

Obesity In Asia: American Fast Food Is Fare For The Rich

Global Demand For Quinoa Means Those Who Grow It Can�t Afford It

Junk Food Makes American Kids �Too Fat To Fight�

Read more:
andes mountains, bolivia, fast food, incas, junk food, peru, Quinoa, vegan, vegetarian

Photo Credit: thinkstock

Read more: http://www.care2.com/causes/huge-quinoa-sales-bring-poverty-to-peru-bolivia.html#ixzz2IRoucJgx

Thursday, January 17, 2013

ANS -- ‘When the burning moment breaks’ : gun control and rage massacres

This article is a bit long, but quite interesting, different, and a bit "intellectual".  It's about cultural reasons for the epidemic of mass shootings we are seeing in the US.  (and some in other places.) It even includes some poetry.
I found it through Brad Hicks. 
find it here:  http://overland.org.au/blogs/new-words/2012/08/when-the-burning-moment-breaks-gun-control-and-rage-massacres/  
--Kim



Next

New Words


'When the burning moment breaks': gun control and rage massacres

Author
Jeff Sparrow
Posted on
6 August 2012

On 23 January 1924, a man opened fire with a .44 repeating rifle on the families picnicking in Melbourne's Botanical Gardens. He shot five people, seemingly targeted at random, before the gun failed. Three died. The murderer, later identified as Norman List, ran from the scene. On 2 February, his body was found in the bush in Pakenham, where he'd killed himself.

Today, in the wake of the Colorado killings and the new atrocity in Wisconsin, all the aspects of List's deeds seem instantly familiar, recognisable components of what forensic psychiatrist Paul Mullen calls the 'autogenic massacre'. Mullen defines the crime thus: 'A heavily armed male, or just occasionally males, enter an area where people congregate and begins shooting victims indiscriminately, continuing with the killing until they turn their guns on themselves, or are shot and killed by police.'

In 1924, such massacres were largely unknown. List's killings were an outlier, an anticipation of a pattern that only became more general much later: as Mullen puts it, 'reports of autogenic massacres do not even begin to appear until the twentieth century and only emerge as a recurring theme in the last thirty years.'

It wasn't until 1966, when a young man opened fire on students and staff at the University of Texas, that what we might call the generic conventions of the 'autogenic massacre' established themselves. What was previously a vanishingly rare crime morphed into something increasingly understood as inevitable. In the last three decades, there have been more than 30 massacres in US schools alone, with six mass killings already in 2012. As Mullen says: 'The autogenic massacre emerged in western society over the last fifty years and is becoming increasingly frequent.'

Why is this happening? What does it mean?

Considerable effort has gone into psychological profiles of would-be killers. But as Christopher Ferguson, Mark Coulson and Jane Barnett note in their study of school shootings: 'Most scholars recognise that empirical evidence on school shooters is slim and that "profiles" of school shooters carry considerable risks of overidentification.'

Clearly, rage gunmen often have psychological problems, often profound ones. But it's necessary to tread carefully here since there's a certain circularity in diagnoses made after terrible crimes: normal people do not commit rage murders; by definition, anyone who does is not normal.

Interestingly, after analysing a number of killers, Mullen concludes, 'they had personality problems and were, to put it mildly, deeply troubled people.' But he goes on to add: 'Most perpetrators of autogenic massacres do not, however, appear to have active psychotic symptoms at the time and very few even have histories of prior contact with mental health services.'

In any case, individual profiling cannot, by its nature, explain why 'deeply troubled' people today conduct massacres in a way that they did not fifty years earlier. What is required is a social and historical analysis.

Perhaps the most interesting attempt in that direction is developed by Mark Ames in his book Going Postal. 'The rage murder is new,' he argues. 'It appeared under Reagan, during his cultural and economic revolution, and it expanded in his aftermath. Reaganomics has ruled America ever since.'

Ames' thesis is that the rage massacre entered public consciousness in the US during 1980s, after a series of killings by postal workers (hence his title). At the time, the postal service was under particular pressure from what we'd now call neoliberalism, as market reform fostered unbearable stress and unhappiness among the employees. When Ames' interviewed massacre survivors, they sometimes expressed a surprising sympathy for the shooters. The experience of work – the activity that most people spend most of their lives performing – had become a waking nightmare, with any sense of job satisfaction destroyed and solidarity between employees collapsing into bullying and minor harassment.

Ames draws a provocative parallel between rage massacres and slavery revolts in the US south: both involved, he suggests, a blind rebellion against intolerable conditions, expressed via homicidal destruction. With unions and other forms of collective redress marginalised, employees, like slaves, lashed out at what surrounded them. The argument thus echoes Hannah Arendt's analysis of the roots of rage, an emotion that she saw as implicitly political.

'Rage,' she writes, 'is by no means an automatic reaction to misery and suffering as such; no one reacts with rage to a disease beyond the powers of medicine or to an earthquake, or, for that matter, to social conditions which seem to be unchangeable. Only where there is reason to suspect that conditions could be changed and are not, does rage arise.'

Ames suggests workplace massacres migrated into the US school system in the 90s, precisely because the education system manifested the worst aspects of the Reaganite industrial culture. There was, he argues, the 'continuity of misery and entrapment from school to office … Even physically, they look alike and act on the mind in a similar way: the overhead fluorescent lights, the economies-of-scale-purchased industrial carpeting and linoleum floors, the stench of cleaning chemicals in the restrooms, the same stalls with the same latches and the same metal toilet paper holders …'

The values of the schoolyard represented, in concentrated form, the values of the society around it. School shooters, like workplace shooters, often complained in their suicide notes of bullying. 'One reason why our society has failed to curb bullying,' Ames says, 'is that we like bullies. Hell, we are bullies. Research has shown that bullies are not the anti-social misfits that adults, in their forced amnesia, want them to be. Rather, bullies are usually the most popular boys, second only on the clique-ranking to those described as friendly, outgoing and self-confident. […] Many kids (and adults) believe that the victims of bullying bring it upon themselves …'

The power of Ames' case stems from its attempt to periodise the phenomenon, in a way that most commentators don't even attempt. But one reason that such crimes resist analysis is that they often seem so undirected. The postal workers might have opened fire on the workplace that seemed the locus on their misery but often rage killers gun down random strangers (as in Colorado). How to explain that?

Contextualising rage massacres shouldn't mean understanding them simply as goal driven. Or, at least, not exclusively. We need to also consider the act itself – about the attractive power of deadly violence itself.

In his memoir of the Second World War, the philosopher J Glenn Gray remarks how combat constituted, for some of his comrades, 'the one great lyric passage in their lives'. It's a surprisingly common sentiment. One Vietnam veteran, a sniper, talked of a long-range shot as an aesthetic pleasure, almost like a poem or a great painting: 'A kill at two klicks, that is beautiful. It stays with you … the bullet vaporizes the guy, explodes into him. Satisfying … hitting the target – beautiful.'

Much of the most overt writing about the pleasure of violence, about the attraction of war, emerged from the First World War. Indeed, the outbreak of the Great War led to mass celebrations, in almost all of the combatant nations. How to explain that enthusiasm?

As the historian Eric Leeds explains, 'It was commonly felt that with the declaration of war, the populations of European nations had left behind an industrial civilisation with its problems and conflicts and were entering a sphere of action ruled by authority, discipline, comradeship and common purpose.' The pleasure of war represented, in other words, an indictment of the peace that it shattered.

Peace meant that men and women were atomised, alienated and alone, impersonal cogs in the gears of industry; war offered an organic collectivity in which there would be a meaningful place for everyone. Again and again in the literature of 1914, you come up against a perception of modernity, with its factories and its technology and its bureaucracy, as soulless and anti-human: a world that was 'old and cold and weary,' as Rupert Brooke says. Battle, by contrast, was thought to restore the values of an age that was passing, understood (in idealised terms) as honour and purpose and camaraderie. Modernity was emasculating, dominated by those Brooke called 'half-men'; combat restored a traditional virility.

Julian Grenfell, another soldier poet (and Great War casualty) expresses the sentiment neatly. Grenfell, who seems to have genuinely enjoyed combat, famously wrote, 'And he is dead who will not fight/And who dies fighting has increase', lines that replicate Brooke's sense of war as a kind of resurrection, an antidote to the bloodless half-life of industrial civilisation. The conclusion of that poem reads like a hymn to the berserker state of the rage murderer.

And when the burning moment breaks,
And all things else are out of mind,
And only joy of battle takes
Him by the throat, and makes him blind,
[…]
The thundering line of battle stands,
And in the air death moans and sings;
But Day shall clasp him with strong hands,
And Night shall fold him in soft wings.

Now, other twentieth-century wars spurred outbreaks of patriotism. But not on a comparable scale – where the First World War began with delirious celebration, the Second World War commenced with a kind of weary resignation. Crucially, the world away from which men were turning in 1914 was one in which the industrial order was still new, a process that had only recently brought millions of people who had previously lived on the land under the sway of commodity relations. And the wrenching novelty of that experience, the sense of shock and dislocation generated by what was then a new phenomenon, helps explain the visceral enthusiasm for war.

There are, however, parallels in the twenty-first century. As I've argued elsewhere, the emotive response to the 9/11 attacks replicated, in many ways, the outbreak of the Great War. Broadcaster Glenn Beck named his Tea Party group the 9/12 Project, in recognition of what he called 'the feeling of togetherness' Americans enjoyed immediately after the terrorist strikes. By explicitly seeking to restore 9/12 rather than 9/10, Beck implies that the outbreak of war actually improved the country, in much the same way as Edwardian militarists thought the European conflict would save Western civilisation.

In 2001, modernity was not new in the way that it had been in 1914. Yet, since the 1980s, the United States, like most industrialised nations, had undergone decades of neoliberal reforms, a process that had extended market forces to every nook and cranny of human existence in a way that previous eras would not have believed possible.

The generation of 2001 could thus share with the generation of August 1914 a sensation of everything they held dear vanishing, a vague feeling of collective identities dissolving before the autistic logic of the cash register. The experience of 9/11, the beginning of the war on terror, provided an overwhelming contrast to isolation, fragmentation, to the collapse of established authorities, an answer to the widespread yearning for meanings and belief.

The Prussian novelist Ernst Jünger described, in 1914, how 'the heroic feeling that a commercial age had slammed into the museums burst out, bright and living'. The same sentiment was expressed, over and over again, back in 2001. For instance, the influential columnist Peggy Noonan wrote of how 9/11 had restored John Wayne, banishing the domination of enfeebled sybarites. Prior to the attacks, America had been like Wayne's hapless sidekick Barry Fitzgerald – a 'small, nervous, gossiping neighborhood commentator … who wanted to talk about everything and do nothing'. For Noonan, the Duke's return signaled the death of the neurotic and empty world of the twenty-first century, in the same way as Brooke turned from 'the sick hearts' and 'half-men' of his day.

This, it seems to me, provides a background to the proliferation of rage murder. On the one hand, ordinary Americans have been, as Ames says, experiencing a concerted assault from neoliberalism for some decades now, producing a profound social dislocation. The traditional bonds between people dissolve, with the normalisation of an ideology of radical individualism. In Europe, the austerity agenda has provoked substantial resistance, and even where those struggles have failed the prospect of collective responses at least provide a framework in which the world can be understood. In the US, however, the traditions of the Left are much weaker, with the result that individuals are more likely to perceive their misery as an existential personal failing.

What's more, more than any other industrialised nation, the US remains deeply embroiled ongoing imperial adventures, conflicts that foster a twenty-first century version of the militaristic values expressed so forcefully in 1914. Throughout the early phases of the Iraq war, the army recruited under the slogans 'Be all you can be' and 'an army of one', catch cries that replicate the Edwardian sense of battle as an experience that will restore the individuality crushed by capitalist modernity.

In that setting, is it really so surprising that Grenfell's joy of battle takes a certain proportion of damaged men by the throat, that some of those who know themselves to be among the detritus of a neoliberal order seek the power and clarity that comes from aiming a rifle and pulling its trigger?

Ames recently discussed the rage murders conducted by One L Goh in Oakland California, who shot eight people, killing three, in Cleveland early this year: 'He failed at everything; he was one of those faceless, anonymous losers. But there was one thing he could still excel at, something that could get him attention, something that this country perversely celebrates: mass murder in a blaze of anti-glory. So long as you're ready to make that transformation-of-character into a death row inmate, that option is always available here.'

What conclusions can we draw?

Most obviously, the rise of rage massacres represents a profound social derangement. At the very least, it's positively perverse to talk about gun massacres without some discussion of America's permanent imperialist wars and the impact they've had on the culture. The Great War lasted four years; the US has been occupying Afghanistan for eleven years and Iraq for nine. You cannot maintain combat operations for that length of time without fostering, both deliberately and otherwise, a militarism closely connected to a sense of personal liberation through violence. War is carcinogenic to the body politic, and the cancers it generates appear in all kinds of unexpected ways.

Yet that context – the unprecedented legitimation of violence provided by years of brutal war – almost never enters the debate. If, as Ballard once said, the suburbs now dream of violence, shouldn't the first question be why? Consider: after the Colorado shootings, well-meaning journalists anguished about how the news might be reported without inspiring fresh crimes. Their worries were not unfounded – immediately after the massacre, tribute pages to the killer proliferated on Facebook; within a few days, a would-be copycat was arrested. But what does it say about a society if random acts of murder now exercise so great an attractive power that it becomes dangerous to even speak of them?

Instead of addressing such questions, the media discussion tends to move immediately to technical responses. The discussion of gun control provides a good example, since, wittingly or not, it channels the tremendously disturbing social implications of these acts in familiar and thus reassuring territory. Because all right thinking people already know that gun control offers a solution to gun crime, this new willingness of ordinary people to commit unthinkable atrocities need not provoke any particularly uncomfortable social reflections.

But, of course, gun control in the US is not nearly as simple as most Australian pundits suggest. As soon as you move from abstractions to real history, you discover a much more complicated narrative about guns in the US than the 'Americans be crazy' caricature so beloved by the Australian Left.

In a fascinating article for the Atlantic last year, Adam Winkler makes a point almost entirely absent from discussions here. 'Indisputably, for much of American history,' he writes, 'gun-control measures, like many other laws, were used to oppress African Americans.'

After losing the Civil War, Southern states quickly adopted the Black Codes, laws designed to reestablish white supremacy by dictating what the freedmen could and couldn't do. One common provision barred blacks from possessing firearms. To enforce the gun ban, white men riding in posses began terrorizing black communities. In January 1866, Harper's Weekly reported that in Mississippi, such groups had 'seized every gun and pistol found in the hands of the (so called) freedmen' in parts of the state. The most infamous of these disarmament posses, of course, was the Ku Klux Klan.

Nor is that simply a matter of the distant past. Winkler reminds us of the relationship between the right to carry arms and the black militancy of the 1960s:

Before he was assassinated in 1965, Malcolm X had preached against Martin Luther King Jr.'s brand of nonviolent resistance. Because the government was 'either unable or unwilling to protect the lives and property' of blacks, he said, they had to defend themselves 'by whatever means necessary.' Malcolm X illustrated the idea for Ebony magazine by posing for photographs in suit and tie, peering out a window with an M-1 carbine semiautomatic in hand. Malcolm X and the [Black] Panthers described their right to use guns in self-defence in constitutional terms. 'Article number two of the constitutional amendments,' Malcolm X argued, 'provides you and me the right to own a rifle or a shotgun.'

Guns became central to the Panthers' identity, as they taught their early recruits that 'the gun is the only thing that will free us – gain us our liberation.'

Thus, contrary to what most commentators imply, the modern movement in support of 'gun rights' began not with the far Right but with the New Left. The key moment came in 1967 when the Black Panthers invaded the California legislature, rifles in hand. At that protest, Bobby Seale argued:

Black people have begged, prayed, petitioned, demonstrated, and everything else to get the racist power structure of America to right the wrongs which have historically been perpetuated against black people. The time has come for black people to arm themselves against this terror before it is too late.

For blacks, the ownership of guns possessed an obvious symbolic importance. An armed black man or woman was someone who rejected the passivity of the slave or the servant, someone who not only asserted their constitutional rights but showed a willingness to defend them. Conservatives understood that message, too: that's why, in the sixties, even the NRA supported calls gun control. The wave of laws passed in the late sixties to limit gun ownership was a direct response to the new black militancy. As one critic said, the legislation was intended, 'not to control guns but to control blacks'.

It's easy, from the safety of history, to dismiss Seale's rhetoric but it should also be noted that, for those in the civil rights movement, guns weren't simply symbolic. In a context in which activists were regularly murdered by racists and police, the possession of guns was also seen as crucial for self-defence. This was not some peculiar fetish of the Panthers but was common throughout the movement. Winkler again:

Civil-rights activists, even those committed to nonviolent resistance, had long appreciated the value of guns for self-protection. Martin Luther King Jr. applied for a permit to carry a concealed firearm in 1956, after his house was bombed. His application was denied, but from then on, armed supporters guarded his home. One adviser, Glenn Smiley, described the King home as 'an arsenal.' William Worthy, a black reporter who covered the civil-rights movement, almost sat on a loaded gun in a living-room armchair during a visit to King's parsonage.

At the very least, this not-so-distant history illustrates that gun control is not as simple as many here would like to believe; that, in fact, there are real reasons why some Americans – and not just homicidal hillbillies – might be less than enthusiastic about legislation restricting their ability to arm themselves.

It's true that the political context today is entirely different. No-one is suggesting that James Holmes is an equivalent to Bobby Seale, much less Martin Luther King. It's also true that people of colour, particularly the poor, suffer disproportionately from gun violence in the US. A recent piece from Salon noted that, while the Colorado massacre was an exceptional event, 'mass shootings in Chicago are far from aberrations and any given weekend in the city can see reports of casualty figures that seem more appropriate to Kandahar than a Midwestern American city.'

Obviously, this is terrible; obviously, progressives need a response. There is no disputing that.

But you cannot simply wave away the particular history attached to gun control in the US setting.

In any case, while much has changed since the 1960s, plenty has remained the same. The Panthers first agitated around the right to bear arms as part of what they called 'patrolling the police'. As a response to ongoing and systemic violence and brutality, they began following patrol cars as they came into the ghettoes, in order to make sure that local people weren't mistreated. Because the Panthers were (legally) armed, the police had to think twice about attacking them – and, because they were monitored, officers were much less able to harass or brutalise ordinary people.

Since that time, the relationship between the police and ghetto communities seems, if anything, to have deteriorated. The last decades have seen an expansion of the US prison system almost unparalleled in history. In America today there are some 1.8 million people in state custody of some sort. As the Atlantic says, 'the American inmate population has grown so large that it is difficult to comprehend: imagine the combined populations of Atlanta, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Des Moines, and Miami behind bars.' Interestingly, the prison population remained stable throughout most of the twentieth century: the real increase took place from the mid-1970s onwards, hypercharged with the boom in private prisons from the 1990s. Naturally, this mass incarceration is highly racialised: almost one in ten black men are behind bars; one in every fifteen black children has a parent in prison; one in three African-American boys born in 2001 stands a lifetime risk of going to jail.

The growth of the prison-industrial complex has been accompanied by an enormous expansion of the police force. Stephan Salisbury notes that, with the money spent on armouring and arming law enforcement since 9/11, the federal government could have

rebuilt post-Katrina New Orleans five times over and had enough money left in the kitty to provide job training and housing for every one of the record 41,000-plus homeless people in New York City. It could have added in the growing population of 15,000 homeless in Philadelphia, my hometown, and still have had money to spare. Add disintegrating Detroit, Newark, and Camden to the list. Throw in some crumbling bridges and roads, too.

It's not just that budgets have increased. The police forces have been militarised to an extraordinary degree. Salisbury points out that Montgomery County, Texas, now has a weapons-capable drone, that the Tampa police have an eight-ton armoured personnel carrier and two tanks; that the Fargo police have bomb detection robots; that Chicago operates some 15 000 interlinked surveillance cameras. New York's mayor Michael Bloomberg now boasts: 'I have my own army in the NYPD, which is the seventh largest army in the world.'

Not surprisingly, lethal police violence in the United States has reached epidemic proportions. Salon notes:

In the days bracketing the Aurora massacre, San Francisco police shot and killed mentally ill Pralith Pralourng; Tampa police shot and killed Javon Neal, 16; an off-duty cop shot Pierre Davis, 20, of Chicago; Miami-Dade police shot and killed an unidentified "stalking suspect"; an off-duty FBI agent shot an unnamed man in Queens; Kansas City police shot and killed 58-year-old Danny L. Walsh; Lynn police and a Massachusetts state trooper shot and killed Brandon Payne, 23, a father of three; Henderson police shot and killed Andy Puente Soto, 42, out in the desert wastes near Las Vegas. …

From January 2003 through December 2009, bureau statistics show 4,813 deaths occurred during 'an arrest or restraint process.'

What those figures show is that interactions with the police are already responsible for a substantial proportion of gun deaths. Entirely predictably, these deaths are racialised – 'If you are a young man, a person of colour, and live in a poor urban area, you are far more likely to become a victim of police gunfire than if you are none of those things.'

Once more, that's the context in which the calls for stricter gun laws are made. The very proliferation of weaponry means that guns can be found throughout poor communities in the inner cities. Passing new anti-firearm laws and then enforcing them means, almost by definition, unleashing militarised police forces upon inner city populations, under circumstances where the police have a demonstrated track record of shooting suspects dead.

Yes, the tragedy of needless gun deaths constituted a genuine problem. But it's a complicated issue, and the knee-jerk invocation of gun control as a magical cure-all, especially when abstracted from the real circumstances of contemporary America, is simply not good enough.

None of this should suggest that the current proliferation of guns is in any way progressive. One doesn't have to be a pacifist to recognise that, actually, the Left succeeds, by and large, via collective social struggle rather than by mobilising individuals with weapons. The Arab Spring provides an obvious illustration: in the countries where the uprisings have been most successful, the revolutions have relied on mass mobilisations, with a turn to armed struggle tending to arise at the moment the movement begins to stall. The real threat posed for authorities by the Panthers lay not with the firearms they'd collected but with the widespread resonance of their defiant militancy within the black population. Indeed, in many respects, their military emphasis contributed to their downfall, by fostering direct individual confrontations with the state that the Panthers couldn't possibly win (a tremendous number of the most talented black leaders of the sixties were shot dead by police).

Nonetheless, what the Panthers and similar organisations represented was a political alternative to the despair of the ghetto, a vision of responding to unemployment and crime and drugs and so on through collective social action. And in that you can see the embryo of what we might call 'gun control from below'.

That is, calls to 'get the guns off the street' fail to acknowledge that the process matters as much as the aim. There's a crucial difference between militarised police sending their tanks and drones into urban areas, and community groups within those areas organising themselves to drive out criminals, encouraging individuals not to carry weapons, picketing gun shops and gun fairs and other attempts to push firearms, and thus providing a collective security so that guns no longer seem necessary.

Grassroots activism of that type might also take up any number of other demands for palliatives to ease the violence, such as better mental health facilities or a stronger social security net for those under financial stress.

Most fundamentally, such efforts could begin to reknit the social connections severed by the neoliberal turn, and by so doing provide the sense of meaning and purpose missing in an intensely atomised society.

What becomes apparent when you hear veterans talking about war is that many of the pleasures of deadly violence are distorted reflections of the principles for which the Left has always campaigned. Combat appeals because, perversely, it makes life seem valuable, because it provides an immediate purpose and a common goal. War fosters camaraderie and connection; it promises to unite men in a way that's diametrically opposed to the ultra-individualism of late capitalism.

One marine, a veteran of Fallujah, I interviewed for my book Killing explained it to me like this:

[N]othing I do from this point on in my life is ever going to compare. Ever. I do a lot of panel discussions and things, and I tell people, I could win the lottery today, have two hundred million dollars, have fast cars, mansions, you name it, and still, it's not going to compare to that feeling of leading marines, other human beings, into combat and doing what we did there. It's almost like I'm going through the motions now for the rest of my life.

That last line is of course the kicker, an extraordinary indictment of the world's richest country, where nothing that peacetime offers can provide an experience of comparable richness to house-to-house fighting in one of the bloodiest punitive missions in recent history.

That's why collective struggles for social change matter so much, and why they are what we should talk about, rather than calls for new state powers, for they contain within them the pleasures found in combat, albeit in a non-alienated fashion. Mass movements offer an alternative experience of solidarity, of collectivity, purpose, value and so on, an experience that can erode the appeal of violence.

'Perhaps the best kept political secret of our time,' writes Barbara Ehrenreich, 'is that politics, as a democratic undertaking, can be not only "fun," in the entertaining sense, but profoundly uplifting, even ecstatic. My generation had a glimpse of this in May 1968 and at other points in that decade, when strangers embraced in the streets and the impossible briefly seemed within reach. Insurgencies again and again engender such moments of transcendence and hope.'

If you experience life as ecstatic, if you see the world full of transcendence and hope, rather than old and cold and weary, you don't have to turn away from it and you're less likely to see killing other humans as, in Brooke's words, 'into cleanness leaping'.

Of course, none of this is easy. There's no magical solution to deranged violence. But the creation of a Left that makes life seem more attractive than death would be a good place to start.

In any case, if that all seems utopian, consider the alternatives. Is the top-down gun control that John Howard and others advocate going to happen? No, of course, it's not. There's no serious prospect of any American politician introducing gun laws that are anything other than token. Why? Partly because campaigns for laws lack a popular constituency, since, in the context outlined above, many ordinary Americans are understandably concerned about a diminution of their rights and an expansion of those enjoyed by the state.

The same point can be expressed in a different way: any attempt to bring in real gun laws so would generate a ferocious campaign by the populist Right, which the liberal Left would be largely incapable of challenging.

Think of how, during the last presidential election, Obama's passing reference to rural communities becoming bitter and clinging to guns and religion became a rallying cry for the Tea Party types who now dominate the Republican Party. Any anti-gun legislation – certainly any anti-gun legislation serious enough to make any difference – would produce similar consequences.

Again, to understand the role of groups like the Tea Party in the gun debate, you have to look at history. As Winkler notes, by and large, in the sixties, conservatives – including the NRA – mostly supported gun restrictions, precisely because they saw such restrictions as aimed at the New Left. It was only later, with the collapse of groups like the Panthers, that bearing arms became a totemic cause for the Right. The obvious example is the militia movement that emerged during the Clinton years: a version of right-wing populism absolutely centred on the same constitutional right to bear arms that the Panthers once invoked.

This was a new mode of conservatism, a paranoid defense of 'liberty' ostensibly mounted against the encroachments of Clintonian 'socialism'. In other words, during a period in which liberals were embracing neoliberalism, the far Right was able to appropriate radical postures that had once belonged to the New Left. As the Left fell in behind Clinton's corporate liberalism, the radical Right became the force most noisily hostile to US foreign policy (via suspicion of the 'New World Order' and its black helicopters), positioning itself in opposition to state power and as the representative of 'freedom' against the government and its agents. Guns were part of that – once more functioning as symbols of resistance, albeit in a deranged, distorted fashion.

That's why, though the political prospect of serious regulation can be assessed at approximately zero, the Left's call for state control of guns is a serious error, since it allows the far Right to claim the mantle of opposition to state power, at precisely a time in which that state power is increasingly discredited and distrusted. We've already seen what this might mean in the way that Ron Paul – a sinister, racist libertarian – was able to appeal to many young people by articulating anti-state positions now completely outside the liberal consensus.

If the Left identifies with the idea that police should have more power to intervene in the communities of the poor at a time when there's growing opposition to the prison-industrial complex (remember those 1.8 million people in state custody!), it's an open invitation for the bigots of the far right to project themselves as the only consistent defenders of liberty.

By contrast, if the Left instead begins on the long and arduous business of establishing a bottom-up solution to the proliferation of guns, we stand a chance not only of isolating the Right and of dissipating the reactionary gun culture but of rebuilding a sense of solidarity, so that living becomes more attractive than killing.

Grey discussed combat as the single lyric passage in an entire life. But let's also remember what Octavio Paz wrote about the experience of struggle in Spain in the thirties: 'Anyone who has looked Hope in the face will never forget it. He will search for it everywhere he goes.'

Monday, January 07, 2013

ANS -- America's Real Criminal Element: Lead



This is an article that says lead in our environment is ones of the big causes of crime and ADHD.  We should clean it up.  We would get good return on our money if we cleaned it up. 
Find it here:   http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/01/lead-crime-link-gasoline?page=1   
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/01/lead-crime-link-gasoline?page=2    
--Kim




Environment
Crime and Justice, Environment, Health, Science, Top Stories
Page 1 of 2 Next


America's Real Criminal Element: Lead


New research finds Pb is the hidden villain behind violent crime, lower IQs, and even the ADHD epidemic. And fixing the problem is a lot cheaper than doing nothing.



­By Kevin Drum
| January/February 2013 Issue
490
lead and crime   Illustration: Gérard DuBois

When Rudy Giuliani ran for mayor of New York City in 1993, he campaigned on a platform of bringing down crime and making the city safe again. It was a comfortable position for a former federal prosecutor with a tough-guy image, but it was more than mere posturing. Since 1960, rape rates had nearly quadrupled, murder had quintupled, and robbery had grown fourteenfold. New Yorkers felt like they lived in a city under siege.

Throughout the campaign, Giuliani embraced a theory of crime fighting called "broken windows," popularized a decade earlier by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in an influential article in The Atlantic . "If a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired," they observed, "all the rest of the windows will soon be broken." So too, tolerance of small crimes would create a vicious cycle ending with entire neighborhoods turning into war zones. But if you cracked down on small crimes, bigger crimes would drop as well.

Giuliani won the election, and he made good on his crime-fighting promises by selecting Boston police chief Bill Bratton as the NYPD's new commissioner. Bratton had made his reputation as head of the New York City Transit Police, where he aggressively applied broken-windows policing to turnstile jumpers and vagrants in subway stations. With Giuliani's eager support, he began applying the same lessons to the entire city, going after panhandlers, drunks, drug pushers, and the city's hated squeegee men. And more: He decentralized police operations and gave precinct commanders more control, keeping them accountable with a pioneering system called CompStat that tracked crime hot spots in real time.
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The results were dramatic. In 1996, the New York Times reported that crime had plunged for the third straight year, the sharpest drop since the end of Prohibition. Since 1993, rape rates had dropped 17 percent, assault 27 percent, robbery 42 percent, and murder an astonishing 49 percent. Giuliani was on his way to becoming America's Mayor and Bratton was on the cover of Time. It was a remarkable public policy victory.

But even more remarkable is what happened next. Shortly after Bratton's star turn, political scientist John DiIulio warned that the echo of the baby boom would soon produce a demographic bulge of millions of young males that he famously dubbed " juvenile super-predators." Other criminologists nodded along. But even though the demographic bulge came right on schedule, crime continued to drop. And drop. And drop. By 2010, violent crime rates in New York City had plunged 75 percent from their peak in the early '90s.

All in all, it seemed to be a story with a happy ending, a triumph for Wilson and Kelling's theory and Giuliani and Bratton's practice. And yet, doubts remained. For one thing, violent crime actually peaked in New York City in 1990, four years before the Giuliani-Bratton era. By the time they took office, it had already dropped 12 percent.


The PB Effect


What happens when you expose a generation of kids to high lead levels? Crime and teen pregnancy data two decades later tell a startling story.



[]  


[]  

Second, and far more puzzling, it's not just New York that has seen a big drop in crime. In city after city, violent crime peaked in the early '90s and then began a steady and spectacular decline. Washington, DC, didn't have either Giuliani or Bratton, but its violent crime rate has dropped 58 percent since its peak. Dallas' has fallen 70 percent. Newark: 74 percent. Los Angeles: 78 percent.

There must be more going on here than just a change in policing tactics in one city. But what?


There are, it turns out, plenty of theories. When I started research for this story, I worked my way through a pair of thick criminology tomes. One chapter regaled me with the "exciting possibility" that it's mostly a matter of economics: Crime goes down when the economy is booming and goes up when it's in a slump. Unfortunately, the theory doesn't seem to hold water­for example, crime rates have continued to drop recently despite our prolonged downturn.

Another chapter suggested that crime drops in big cities were mostly a reflection of the crack epidemic of the '80s finally burning itself out. A trio of authors identified three major "drug eras" in New York City, the first dominated by heroin, which produced limited violence, and the second by crack, which generated spectacular levels of it. In the early '90s, these researchers proposed, the children of CrackGen switched to marijuana, choosing a less violent and more law-abiding lifestyle. As they did, crime rates in New York and other cities went down.

Another chapter told a story of demographics: As the number of young men increases, so does crime. Unfortunately for this theory, the number of young men increased during the '90s, but crime dropped anyway.

There were chapters in my tomes on the effect of prison expansion. On guns and gun control. On family. On race. On parole and probation. On the raw number of police officers. It seemed as if everyone had a pet theory. In 1999, economist Steven Levitt, later famous as the coauthor of Freakonomics, teamed up with John Donohue to suggest that crime dropped because of Roe v. Wade; legalized abortion, they argued, led to fewer unwanted babies, which meant fewer maladjusted and violent young men two decades later.

But there's a problem common to all of these theories: It's hard to tease out actual proof. Maybe the end of the crack epidemic contributed to a decline in inner-city crime, but then again, maybe it was really the effect of increased incarceration, more cops on the beat, broken-windows policing, and a rise in abortion rates 20 years earlier. After all, they all happened at the same time.

To address this problem, the field of econometrics gives researchers an enormous toolbox of sophisticated statistical techniques. But, notes statistician and conservative commentator Jim Manzi in his recent book Uncontrolled, econometrics consistently fails to explain most of the variation in crime rates. After reviewing 122 known field tests, Manzi found that only 20 percent demonstrated positive results for specific crime-fighting strategies, and none of those positive results were replicated in follow-up studies.


Did Lead Make You Dumber?


Even low levels have a significant effect.



[]  



So we're back to square one. More prisons might help control crime, more cops might help, and better policing might help. But the evidence is thin for any of these as the main cause. What are we missing?

Experts often suggest that crime resembles an epidemic. But what kind? Karl Smith, a professor of public economics and government at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, has a good rule of thumb for categorizing epidemics: If it spreads along lines of communication, he says, the cause is information. Think Bieber Fever. If it travels along major transportation routes, the cause is microbial. Think influenza. If it spreads out like a fan, the cause is an insect. Think malaria. But if it's everywhere, all at once­as both the rise of crime in the '60s and '70s and the fall of crime in the '90s seemed to be­the cause is a molecule.

A molecule? That sounds crazy. What molecule could be responsible for a steep and sudden decline in violent crime?

Well, here's one possibility: Pb(CH2CH3)4.
 

In 1994, Rick Nevin was a consultant working for the US Department of Housing and Urban Development on the costs and benefits of removing lead paint from old houses. This has been a topic of intense study because of the growing body of research linking lead exposure in small children with a whole raft of complications later in life, including lower IQ, hyperactivity, behavioral problems, and learning disabilities.

But as Nevin was working on that assignment, his client suggested they might be missing something. A recent study had suggested a link between childhood lead exposure and juvenile delinquency later on. Maybe reducing lead exposure had an effect on violent crime too?

That tip took Nevin in a different direction. The biggest source of lead in the postwar era, it turns out, wasn't paint. It was leaded gasoline. And if you chart the rise and fall of atmospheric lead caused by the rise and fall of leaded gasoline consumption, you get a pretty simple upside-down U: Lead emissions from tailpipes rose steadily from the early '40s through the early '70s, nearly quadrupling over that period. Then, as unleaded gasoline began to replace leaded gasoline, emissions plummeted.
Gasoline lead may explain as much as 90 percent of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century.

Intriguingly, violent crime rates followed the same upside-down U pattern. The only thing different was the time period: Crime rates rose dramatically in the '60s through the '80s, and then began dropping steadily starting in the early '90s. The two curves looked eerily identical, but were offset by about 20 years.

So Nevin dove in further, digging up detailed data on lead emissions and crime rates to see if the similarity of the curves was as good as it seemed. It turned out to be even better: In a 2000 paper (PDF) he concluded that if you add a lag time of 23 years, lead emissions from automobiles explain 90 percent of the variation in violent crime in America. Toddlers who ingested high levels of lead in the '40s and '50s really were more likely to become violent criminals in the '60s, '70s, and '80s.

And with that we have our molecule: tetraethyl lead, the gasoline additive invented by General Motors in the 1920s to prevent knocking and pinging in high-performance engines. As auto sales boomed after World War II, and drivers in powerful new cars increasingly asked service station attendants to "fill 'er up with ethyl," they were unwittingly creating a crime wave two decades later.

It was an exciting conjecture, and it prompted an immediate wave of…nothing. Nevin's paper was almost completely ignored, and in one sense it's easy to see why­Nevin is an economist, not a criminologist, and his paper was published in Environmental Research, not a journal with a big readership in the criminology community. What's more, a single correlation between two curves isn't all that impressive, econometrically speaking. Sales of vinyl LPs rose in the postwar period too, and then declined in the '80s and '90s. Lots of things follow a pattern like that. So no matter how good the fit, if you only have a single correlation it might just be a coincidence. You need to do something more to establish causality.

As it turns out, however, a few hundred miles north someone was doing just that. In the late '90s, Jessica Wolpaw Reyes was a graduate student at Harvard casting around for a dissertation topic that eventually became a study she published in 2007 as a public health policy professor at Amherst. "I learned about lead because I was pregnant and living in old housing in Harvard Square," she told me, and after attending a talk where future Freakonomics star Levitt outlined his abortion/crime theory, she started thinking about lead and crime. Although the association seemed plausible, she wanted to find out whether increased lead exposure caused increases in crime. But how?
In states where consumption of leaded gasoline declined slowly, crime declined slowly. Where it declined quickly, crime declined quickly.

The answer, it turned out, involved "several months of cold calling" to find lead emissions data at the state level. During the '70s and '80s, the introduction of the catalytic converter, combined with increasingly stringent Environmental Protection Agency rules, steadily reduced the amount of leaded gasoline used in America, but Reyes discovered that this reduction wasn't uniform. In fact, use of leaded gasoline varied widely among states, and this gave Reyes the opening she needed. If childhood lead exposure really did produce criminal behavior in adults, you'd expect that in states where consumption of leaded gasoline declined slowly, crime would decline slowly too. Conversely, in states where it declined quickly, crime would decline quickly. And that's exactly what she found.

Meanwhile, Nevin had kept busy as well, and in 2007 he published a new paper looking at crime trends around the world (PDF). This way, he could make sure the close match he'd found between the lead curve and the crime curve wasn't just a coincidence. Sure, maybe the real culprit in the United States was something else happening at the exact same time, but what are the odds of that same something happening at several different times in several different countries?

Nevin collected lead data and crime data for Australia and found a close match. Ditto for Canada. And Great Britain and Finland and France and Italy and New Zealand and West Germany. Every time, the two curves fit each other astonishingly well. When I spoke to Nevin about this, I asked him if he had ever found a country that didn't fit the theory. "No," he replied. "Not one."

Just this year, Tulane University researcher Howard Mielke published a paper with demographer Sammy Zahran on the correlation of lead and crime at the city level. They studied six US cities that had both good crime data and good lead data going back to the '50s, and they found a good fit in every single one. In fact, Mielke has even studied lead concentrations at the neighborhood level in New Orleans and shared his maps with the local police. "When they overlay them with crime maps," he told me, "they realize they match up."


Location, Location, Location


In New Orleans, lead levels can vary dramatically from one neighborhood to the next­and the poorest neighborhoods tend to be the worst hit.



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Maps by Karen Minot

Put all this together and you have an astonishing body of evidence. We now have studies at the international level, the national level, the state level, the city level, and even the individual level. Groups of children have been followed from the womb to adulthood, and higher childhood blood lead levels are consistently associated with higher adult arrest rates for violent crimes. All of these studies tell the same story: Gasoline lead is responsible for a good share of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century.
When differences of atmospheric lead density between big and small cities largely went away, so did the difference in murder rates.

Like many good theories, the gasoline lead hypothesis helps explain some things we might not have realized even needed explaining. For example, murder rates have always been higher in big cities than in towns and small cities. We're so used to this that it seems unsurprising, but Nevin points out that it might actually have a surprising explanation­because big cities have lots of cars in a small area, they also had high densities of atmospheric lead during the postwar era. But as lead levels in gasoline decreased, the differences between big and small cities largely went away. And guess what? The difference in murder rates went away too. Today, homicide rates are similar in cities of all sizes. It may be that violent crime isn't an inevitable consequence of being a big city after all.

The gasoline lead story has another virtue too: It's the only hypothesis that persuasively explains both the rise of crime in the '60s and '70s and its fall beginning in the '90s. Two other theories­the baby boom demographic bulge and the drug explosion of the '60s­at least have the potential to explain both, but neither one fully fits the known data. Only gasoline lead, with its dramatic rise and fall following World War II, can explain the equally dramatic rise and fall in violent crime.
Next Page: An annual investment of $20 billion for 20 years could produce returns of 10-to-1 every single year for decades to come.


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America's Real Criminal Element: Lead


New research finds Pb is the hidden villain behind violent crime, lower IQs, and even the ADHD epidemic. And fixing the problem is a lot cheaper than doing nothing.



­By Kevin Drum
| January/February 2013 Issue
490

If econometric studies were all there were to the story of lead, you'd be justified in remaining skeptical no matter how good the statistics look. Even when researchers do their best­controlling for economic growth, welfare payments, race, income, education level, and everything else they can think of­it's always possible that something they haven't thought of is still lurking in the background. But there's another reason to take the lead hypothesis seriously, and it might be the most compelling one of all: Neurological research is demonstrating that lead's effects are even more appalling, more permanent, and appear at far lower levels than we ever thought. For starters, it turns out that childhood lead exposure at nearly any level can seriously and permanently reduce IQ. Blood lead levels are measured in micrograms per deciliter, and levels once believed safe­65 g/dL, then 25, then 15, then 10­are now known to cause serious damage. The EPA now says flatly that there is "no demonstrated safe concentration of lead in blood," and it turns out that even levels under 10 g/dL can reduce IQ by as much as seven points. An estimated 2.5 percent of children nationwide have lead levels above 5 g/dL.
Is there lead in your house?  
Is There Lead in Your House?

But we now know that lead's effects go far beyond just IQ. Not only does lead promote apoptosis, or cell death, in the brain, but the element is also chemically similar to calcium. When it settles in cerebral tissue, it prevents calcium ions from doing their job, something that causes physical damage to the developing brain that persists into adulthood.

Only in the last few years have we begun to understand exactly what effects this has. A team of researchers at the University of Cincinnati has been following a group of 300 children for more than 30 years and recently performed a series of MRI scans that highlighted the neurological differences between subjects who had high and low exposure to lead during early childhood.
High childhood exposure damages a part of the brain linked to aggression control and "executive functions." And the impact turns out to be greater among boys.

One set of scans found that lead exposure is linked to production of the brain's white matter­primarily a substance called myelin, which forms an insulating sheath around the connections between neurons. Lead exposure degrades both the formation and structure of myelin, and when this happens, says Kim Dietrich, one of the leaders of the imaging studies, "neurons are not communicating effectively." Put simply, the network connections within the brain become both slower and less coordinated.

A second study found that high exposure to lead during childhood was linked to a permanent loss of gray matter in the prefrontal cortex­a part of the brain associated with aggression control as well as what psychologists call "executive functions": emotional regulation, impulse control, attention, verbal reasoning, and mental flexibility. One way to understand this, says Kim Cecil, another member of the Cincinnati team, is that lead affects precisely the areas of the brain "that make us most human."

So lead is a double whammy: It impairs specific parts of the brain responsible for executive functions and it impairs the communication channels between these parts of the brain. For children like the ones in the Cincinnati study, who were mostly inner-city kids with plenty of strikes against them already, lead exposure was, in Cecil's words, an "additional kick in the gut." And one more thing: Although both sexes are affected by lead, the neurological impact turns out to be greater among boys than girls.

Other recent studies link even minuscule blood lead levels with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Even at concentrations well below those usually considered safe­levels still common today­lead increases the odds of kids developing ADHD.

In other words, as Reyes summarized the evidence in her paper, even moderately high levels of lead exposure are associated with aggressivity, impulsivity, ADHD, and lower IQ. And right there, you've practically defined the profile of a violent young offender.

Needless to say, not every child exposed to lead is destined for a life of crime. Everyone over the age of 40 was probably exposed to too much lead during childhood, and most of us suffered nothing more than a few points of IQ loss. But there were plenty of kids already on the margin, and millions of those kids were pushed over the edge from being merely slow or disruptive to becoming part of a nationwide epidemic of violent crime. Once you understand that, it all becomes blindingly obvious. Of course massive lead exposure among children of the postwar era led to larger numbers of violent criminals in the '60s and beyond. And of course when that lead was removed in the '70s and '80s, the children of that generation lost those artificially heightened violent tendencies.
Police chiefs "want to think what they do on a daily basis matters," says a public health expert. "And it does." But maybe not as much as they think.

But if all of this solves one mystery, it shines a high-powered klieg light on another: Why has the lead/crime connection been almost completely ignored in the criminology community? In the two big books I mentioned earlier, one has no mention of lead at all and the other has a grand total of two passing references. Nevin calls it "exasperating" that crime researchers haven't seriously engaged with lead, and Reyes told me that although the public health community was interested in her paper, criminologists have largely been AWOL. When I asked Sammy Zahran about the reaction to his paper with Howard Mielke on correlations between lead and crime at the city level, he just sighed. "I don't think criminologists have even read it," he said. All of this jibes with my own reporting. Before he died last year, James Q. Wilson­father of the broken-windows theory, and the dean of the criminology community­had begun to accept that lead probably played a meaningful role in the crime drop of the '90s. But he was apparently an outlier. None of the criminology experts I contacted showed any interest in the lead hypothesis at all.

Why not? Mark Kleiman, a public policy professor at the University of California-Los Angeles who has studied promising methods of controlling crime, suggests that because criminologists are basically sociologists, they look for sociological explanations, not medical ones. My own sense is that interest groups probably play a crucial role: Political conservatives want to blame the social upheaval of the '60s for the rise in crime that followed. Police unions have reasons for crediting its decline to an increase in the number of cops. Prison guards like the idea that increased incarceration is the answer. Drug warriors want the story to be about drug policy. If the actual answer turns out to be lead poisoning, they all lose a big pillar of support for their pet issue. And while lead abatement could be big business for contractors and builders, for some reason their trade groups have never taken it seriously.

More generally, we all have a deep stake in affirming the power of deliberate human action. When Reyes once presented her results to a conference of police chiefs, it was, unsurprisingly, a tough sell. "They want to think that what they do on a daily basis matters," she says. "And it does." But it may not matter as much as they think. 


So is this all just an interesting history lesson? After all, leaded gasoline has been banned since 1996, so even if it had a major impact on violent crime during the 20th century, there's nothing more to be done on that front. Right?

Wrong. As it turns out, tetraethyl lead is like a zombie that refuses to die. Our cars may be lead-free today, but they spent more than 50 years spewing lead from their tailpipes, and all that lead had to go somewhere. And it did: It settled permanently into the soil that we walk on, grow our food in, and let our kids play around.

That's especially true in the inner cores of big cities, which had the highest density of automobile traffic. Mielke has been studying lead in soil for years, focusing most of his attention on his hometown of New Orleans, and he's measured 10 separate census tracts there with lead levels over 1,000 parts per million.

To get a sense of what this means, you have to look at how soil levels of lead typically correlate with blood levels, which are what really matter. Mielke has studied this in New Orleans, and it turns out that the numbers go up very fast even at low levels. Children who live in neighborhoods with a soil level of 100 ppm have average blood lead concentrations of 3.8 g/dL­a level that's only barely tolerable. At 500 ppm, blood levels go up to 5.9 g/dL, and at 1,000 ppm they go up to 7.5 g/dL. These levels are high enough to do serious damage.
"I know people who have moved into gentrified neighborhoods and immediately renovate everything. They create huge hazards for their kids."

Mielke's partner, Sammy Zahran, walked me through a lengthy­and hair-raising­presentation about the effect that all that old gasoline lead continues to have in New Orleans. The very first slide describes the basic problem: Lead in soil doesn't stay in the soil. Every summer, like clockwork, as the weather dries up, all that lead gets kicked back into the atmosphere in a process called resuspension. The zombie lead is back to haunt us.

Mark Laidlaw, a doctoral student who has worked with Mielke, explains how this works: People and pets track lead dust from soil into houses, where it's ingested by small children via hand-to-mouth contact. Ditto for lead dust generated by old paint inside houses. This dust cocktail is where most lead exposure today comes from.

Paint hasn't played a big role in our story so far, but that's only because it didn't play a big role in the rise of crime in the postwar era and its subsequent fall. Unlike gasoline lead, lead paint was a fairly uniform problem during this period, producing higher overall lead levels, especially in inner cities, but not changing radically over time. (It's a different story with the first part of the 20th century, when use of lead paint did rise and then fall somewhat dramatically. Sure enough, murder rates rose and fell in tandem.)

And just like gasoline lead, a lot of that lead in old housing is still around. Lead paint chips flaking off of walls are one obvious source of lead exposure, but an even bigger one, says Rick Nevin, are old windows. Their friction surfaces generate lots of dust as they're opened and closed. (Other sources­lead pipes and solder, leaded fuel used in private aviation, and lead smelters­account for far less.)

We know that the cost of all this lead is staggering, not just in lower IQs, delayed development, and other health problems, but in increased rates of violent crime as well. So why has it been so hard to get it taken seriously?

There are several reasons. One of them was put bluntly by Herbert Needleman, one of the pioneers of research into the effect of lead on behavior. A few years ago, a reporter from the Baltimore City Paper asked him why so little progress had been made recently on combating the lead-poisoning problem. "Number one," he said without hesitation, "it's a black problem." But it turns out that this is an outdated idea. Although it's true that lead poisoning affects low-income neighborhoods disproportionately, it affects plenty of middle-class and rich neighborhoods as well. "It's not just a poor-inner-city-kid problem anymore," Nevin says. "I know people who have moved into gentrified neighborhoods and immediately renovate everything. And they create huge hazards for their kids."

Tamara Rubin, who lives in a middle-class neighborhood in Portland, Oregon, learned this the hard way when two of her children developed lead poisoning after some routine home improvement in 2005. A few years later, Rubin started the Lead Safe America Foundation, which advocates for lead abatement and lead testing. Her message: If you live in an old neighborhood or an old house, get tested. And if you renovate, do it safely.

Another reason that lead doesn't get the attention it deserves is that too many people think the problem was solved years ago. They don't realize how much lead is still hanging around, and they don't understand just how much it costs us.

It's difficult to put firm numbers to the costs and benefits of lead abatement. But for a rough idea, let's start with the two biggest costs. Nevin estimates that there are perhaps 16 million pre-1960 houses with lead-painted windows, and replacing them all would cost something like $10 billion per year over 20 years. Soil cleanup in the hardest-hit urban neighborhoods is tougher to get a handle on, with estimates ranging from $2 to $36 per square foot. A rough extrapolation from Mielke's estimate to clean up New Orleans suggests that a nationwide program might cost another $10 billion per year.
We can either get rid of the remaining lead, or we can wait 20 years and then lock up all the kids who've turned into criminals.

So in round numbers that's about $20 billion per year for two decades. But the benefits would be huge. Let's just take a look at the two biggest ones. By Mielke and Zahran's estimates, if we adopted the soil standard of a country like Norway (roughly 100 ppm or less), it would bring about $30 billion in annual returns from the cognitive benefits alone (higher IQs, and the resulting higher lifetime earnings). Cleaning up old windows might double this. And violent crime reduction would be an even bigger benefit. Estimates here are even more difficult, but Mark Kleiman suggests that a 10 percent drop in crime­a goal that seems reasonable if we get serious about cleaning up the last of our lead problem­could produce benefits as high as $150 billion per year.

Put this all together and the benefits of lead cleanup could be in the neighborhood of $200 billion per year. In other words, an annual investment of $20 billion for 20 years could produce returns of 10-to-1 every single year for decades to come. Those are returns that Wall Street hedge funds can only dream of.


Memo to Deficit Hawks: Get the Lead Out


Lead abatement isn't cheap, but the return on investment is mind-blowing.



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There's a flip side to this too. At the same time that we should reassess the low level of attention we pay to the remaining hazards from lead, we should probably also reassess the high level of attention we're giving to other policies. Chief among these is the prison-building boom that started in the mid-'70s. As crime scholar William Spelman wrote a few years ago, states have "doubled their prison populations, then doubled them again, increasing their costs by more than $20 billion per year"­money that could have been usefully spent on a lot of other things. And while some scholars conclude that the prison boom had an effect on crime, recent research suggests that rising incarceration rates suffer from diminishing returns: Putting more criminals behind bars is useful up to a point, but beyond that we're just locking up more people without having any real impact on crime. What's more, if it's true that lead exposure accounts for a big part of the crime decline that we formerly credited to prison expansion and other policies, those diminishing returns might be even more dramatic than we believe. We probably overshot on prison construction years ago; one doubling might have been enough. Not only should we stop adding prison capacity, but we might be better off returning to the incarceration rates we reached in the mid-'80s.

So this is the choice before us: We can either attack crime at its root by getting rid of the remaining lead in our environment, or we can continue our current policy of waiting 20 years and then locking up all the lead-poisoned kids who have turned into criminals. There's always an excuse not to spend more money on a policy as tedious-sounding as lead abatement­budgets are tight, and research on a problem as complex as crime will never be definitive­but the association between lead and crime has, in recent years, become pretty overwhelming. If you gave me the choice, right now, of spending $20 billion less on prisons and cops and spending $20 billion more on getting rid of lead, I'd take the deal in a heartbeat. Not only would solving our lead problem do more than any prison to reduce our crime problem, it would produce smarter, better-adjusted kids in the bargain. There's nothing partisan about this, nothing that should appeal more to one group than another. It's just common sense. Cleaning up the rest of the lead that remains in our environment could turn out to be the cheapest, most effective crime prevention tool we have. And we could start doing it tomorrow.

Support for this story was provided by a grant from the Puffin Foundation Investigative Journalism Project.
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Kevin Drum



Political Blogger

Kevin Drum is a political blogger for Mother Jones. For more of his stories, click here. RSS | Twitter
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More MoJo coverage of the dangers of lead.