Tuesday, November 01, 2016

ANS -- 6 Reasons Why A New Civil War Is Possible And Terrifying

This one is about a possible civil war here in the US.  It's long and frightening.  they think it won't be between the North and South or the East and West, but between rural and urban.  Scary.
--Kim


6 Reasons Why A New Civil War Is Possible And Terrifying

Over the last few weeks a growing number of people have started wondering, "Is it possible the United States is heading for a new civil war?" Granted, most of those people are writers for sites like Russia Today or the Huffington Post, and thus slightly less credible than a handful of Bazooka Joe gum wrapper comics. But Donald Trump has made a few tinpot dictator-ish statements recently.

And we did just see an anti-government militia get off scot-free for occupying a federal buildingand pooping just, everywhere. And we are seeing shit like this in our pre-election headlines:

Every time I wanted to dismiss those headlines I thought about my visit to Ukraine last year, to cover their ongoing civil war. The most common sentence I heard was, "It's like a bad dream." Up to the minute the shooting started, almost no one thought civil war was a serious possibility.

So instead of waking up one day and screaming, "Holy shit, I can't believe I didn't take this possibility seriously," I decided to take the possibility seriously. I talked to David Kilcullen, former Chief Strategist in the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism. He helped plan the successful "surge" in Iraq, and he's seen a lot of civil wars in his time. He didn't consider a new U.S. civil war likely ... but he was also pretty damn far from ruling it out: "I think what we're seeing now is, what I would describe as a proto-insurgency situation ... the ingredients are out there, if somebody knew what they were doing, [they could] pull together an effective movement."

So in the unlikely (but possible) event the U.S. broke out in a new civil war, what would it look like? I rounded up every civilian and military expert I could find and asked them that question. To my surprise, they all got back to me, and with the terrifying thought of me now definitelybeing on a U.S. terrorist watch list for doing this research, I learned ...

6
The Beginning Looks A Lot Like Where We Are Right Now

Scott Olson/Getty Images

Since 1972, the General Social Survey has collected data on how many Americans think "most people can be trusted." A guy named Josh Morgan graphed it, and while the south has always taken a more "we don't like your kind 'round here" position, most of America started the 70s in a pretty good place:

Josh Morgan

Now fast-forward to 2012:

Josh Morgan

"Trust" isn't just an intangible concept when we're talking about the potential for civil warfare. Sinisa Malesevic is a professor who studies the sociology of civil wars and a survivor of the Yugoslavian civil war. He's someone Marvel really should've reached out to for script advice, and he noted the breakdown of trust was one of the first traumatizing steps to war, "... in a very short period of time, there is a complete sense of fear, you do not know who is who, who is supporting which side ... that fear spreads."

Sinisa also pointed out that most civil wars start after a loss of trust in the government, particularly law enforcement: "One of the defining features of any state is a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence." In other words, if we trust the police to handle bad guys better than armed groups of vigilantes, we'll probably trust the government more than armed groups of insurgents.

"And if police are not seen as doing their job ... I think that certainly has an impact."

Colonel David Couvillon, a Marine Reserve officer who governed the Wasit province of Iraq after the start of the occupation, pointed out that insurgents can win without convincing anyone that they're "right." It'd be enough to push most Americans into the "both sides are evil" camp, which ... isn't an unfamiliar place for most of us to be:

"If you undermine the moral authority that the government or the military or the police forces have, you win. Then they become the enemy to everybody ... it may not goad you into armed insurgency, but it will goad you into a certain acceptance. And once the guerrillas reach acceptance, they have a path to win."

And so a big part of any hypothetical U.S. rebellion's job, undermining public confidence in the police, has already been accomplished by the deadly alliance of "our police acting the way they've always acted" and "smartphones." This isn't just happening on the left wing, either. David Kilcullen is worried that the FBI is nearing a legitimacy crisis among American conservatives: "That's why I think the politicization of the FBI via the Hillary emails ... is very dangerous. People now start to see the FBI as a political secret police ... there's always been a belief that this is the case but that hasn't been [widespread]."

This is important because it's the FBI's job to deal with domestic terrorism, including all those right-wing militias, and they can only do their job if people on the extreme right trust them ... which now that I think about it, sounds like one of the really crappy episodes of Heroes back when it first started to dip into "this sucks" territory. Daryl Johnson, a former Homeland Security analyst who specialized in the militia movement, pointed out that "militia members turning on other militia members" is how the FBI gets a ton of its information. After the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Bureau started "setting up communications channels" with members of the militia movement "to try and defuse some of the paranoia." But, he added, "Definitely since Ferguson there's been an erosion of public trust in law enforcement in both the far right and far left." And as for the public's trust in the American government well, this Pew graph says more than I could without just making fart noises with my mouth.

Pew Research Center

So, how's our hypothetical civil war likely to kick off?

5
The Violence Could Start With Farms Choking The Cities

Alex Wong/Getty Images

David Kilcullen was bullish on Deliverance country as the site for the start of our hypothetical Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo, "... Southern Appalachia."

He noted that he wasn't yet seeing "the organization out there" that might portend a bubba-dominated insurgent movement, but also noted that, "... it's like a gathering series of storm clouds and it's yet to get to a lighting strike".

Colonel Couvillon also thought any conflict was likely to start in a rural area, "...people talk about, is it gonna be class warfare, race warfare ... is it gonna be north versus south? Personally, I think it's gonna be urban versus rural."

It's easy to imagine the basic scenario. Some Cliven Bundy-like stand-off on a ranch or in a small town sets up our Hollywood-loving brains for a Swayze-led shootout between folksy ranchers and imperial fucking stormtroopers:

Stephen Brashear/Getty Images

Ammon Bundy and the other militia who occupied the Malheur Wildlife Refuge were acquitted by a jury of their peers. That should give you an idea of how much support the American militia movement has in certain parts of the country. Daryl Johnson, our former Homeland Security analyst, worried that many rural police departments would be unable to effectively suppress their militia because, "... a lot of these rural police departments are outmanned and outgunned by the militia ... you have a small department, in some areas there may be twice as many or three times as many militia members."

During our talk David Kilcullen brought up something called the boomerang effect, where "... colonial powers go overseas, and apply techniques to suppressing colonial foreign subjects which then again come to their homeland." In other words, "... techniques pioneered in Iraq and Afghanistan ... being brought to the United States." He's talking about things like roadside bombs. David was particularly worried about a substance called Tannerite, which is totally legal to purchase and is basically Michael Bay boner fuel: "I am astounded that you can buy tannerite online ... what tannerite is, is ammonium nitrate plus powdered aluminum. World War 2 bombs were filled with stuff that is essentially the same thing."

How To HuntIt's as much fun as it looks. It's also as deadly as it looks so ... scratch?

And a wide enough roadside bombing campaign could literally starve many American cities. 90% of food in the U.S. is transported by truck. Colonel Couvillon called our highway system a "key vulnerability" in any hypothetical civil war. And added, "Our way of life right here is about nine meals from anarchy."

The United States military is forbidden from directly engaging in law enforcement within the boundaries of the United States. It's a rule called posse comitatus. Colonel Couvillon explained that, for officers at least, "... it's ingrained ... you're not the brownshirts, you're not the Gestapo, you're not the kempe thai, or any of the other strong-armed people ... [in] the military, um, the posse comitatus rules are golden. They adhere to those consistently."

But if mass starvation was on the table (er ... off the table? I think I just created a paradoxical metaphor), you can bet the military would get called out to help fight the insurgency. Colonel Couvillon seemed to view that as a nightmare proposition, "If you remember the riots in LA in the middle nineties ... when they called the marines up from Camp Pendeleton, that was traumatic. That shook the military all over the place ..." Deploying American soldiers to fight American insurgents would be several Old Yellers of magnitude more traumatizing, "... say you move a combat unit from, ah ... Fort AP Hill ... into New York, and 10% of your army guys are from New York. And all of a sudden they're facing possible relatives ... do they turn more aggressive or less aggressive, what happens?"

NewsweekThis doesn't even cover the possibility of some members being people you may have actually served with. (More on that in a bit)

Nobody really knows. But he was willing to admit that a U.S. military crackdown on any kind of insurgency could get really ugly. Like Gary Busey's teeth levels of ugly.

"There's always restraint there to start with. And then the insurgency or the protests can incite the forces ... and if you have superior weapons and start to bear down on [them], then it becomes an atrocity ..."

And, if that happens, it'd be playing right into the insurgent's hands.

Continue Reading Below

4
The Revolution Will Plagiarize ISIS's Tactics

ISIS

Since David Kilcullen's actually helped fight a couple of civil wars, I asked him to which strategies he thought we'd be most likely to see in our hypothetical civil war. He seemed most concerned with a new jihadi strategy, outlined in The Management of Savagery, a book that was basically the blueprint ISIS used to build their McMansion of Suffering.

None of those strategies included learning cover design.

"You don't try to generate a mass movement ... you don't try to get the state to crack down on you, instead you try to generate a sectarian civil war so intense it makes the society ungovernable ... and then you bring forth a sort of rules based system to give people predictability."

The outbreak of that civil war wouldn't look all that different from the normal news cycle, at first. David noted that it might start with a series of politically-motivated mass shootings and bombings, carried out with the express intent of generating copycat attacks. It's not as crazy as it sounds; ISIS didn't spend a dime to make the Orlando attack happen, they just had to convince the right guy with a gun. All these attacks are carried out with, "the conscious goal of ... generating a backlash ... I think it's just a matter of time. There's nothing about those ISIS propaganda techniques that's inherently Islamic. It's just a technique."

And the most vocal militiamen out there aren't shy in pointing out that they're already looking to successful Islamic insurgent movements for inspiration. Check out this website by a militia who apparently think web design peaked in 1999.

They cite the fighting in the war on terror as a reason why a band of bearded, oxycontin-popping hillfolk might overthrow the U.S. government:

When your best-case scenario is, "Be like the Taliban" it might be time to rethink your value system.

But a few scattered bands of armed nuts won't make a civil war. As David explained, "In insurgency theory, we typically break down an insurgency into three groups, the actual guerilla fighters," and "what we call the auxiliary ... who run the functional support networks," these are the illicit veterinarians who pull bullets out of our hypothetical insurgents, the civilians who help feed and hide them, "... and then the underground ... engages in propaganda, assassinations, robs banks and drives the movement forward ..."

The guerillas have the sexiest job, but they're nothing but armed men posing for Facebook photos without the support of a network. David explained that, for every dozen armed guys you need, "... maybe a hundred guys in the auxiliary ... and a thousand guys in the underground movement ... now you're talking about an insurgency."

And it turns out vicious insurgencies are a little bit like potato chips: you're never going to have just one ...

3
There Will Be Hundreds of Sides

George Frey/Getty Images

Our last Civil War involved two sides who came pre-packaged with a convenient ideological cheat-sheet (Union: less slavery, Confederacy, more slavery). David Kilcullen doesn't expect a modern Civil War would be nearly that simple, "One of the lessons we found in Iraq ... is it's actually a lot harder to fight a disunited and fragmented insurgency, than to fight a united one ... at one point when I was in Iraq I counted 170 groups that were fighting us." Yeah, it turns out all those "Join or Die" flags were lying to us. Uncle Sam is real good at throttling enemies. He's less skilled at Whack-A-Mole.

David felt that any potential U.S. civil war would involve more than two sides. He explained that it doesn't matter if most of those sides are in conflict with most of the others; the more groups there are, the better their odds of success. And the rise of one credible insurgent group would make other rebellion-inclined individuals, even those on the opposite end of the political spectrum, more likely to whip out their big ol' hogs and join the group helicoptering.

"If you look at the Black Lives Matter movement, there's actually some parallels to what's happening in that group and what's happening at the fringe of the survivalist movement..." David pointed out that, if Trump were elected, "it's possible" that left-wing groups might ignite the violence, "I think it's a broader phenomenon than just white supremacists, and just preppers." For an idea of how "broad" it could get, just look at the Baton Rouge shooter, Gavin Long, who shot six cops, killing three of them. He was affiliated with a black separatist groupthat also held some beliefs in common with Sovereign Citizens, a belief system most common among white, right-wing anti-government nuts. Any American civil war would generate a list of groups at least as long and confusing as the Syrian civil war:

Jeffrey Bolling/Institute for the Study of WarNote that these are just the rebel groups fighting in a single city.

Bill Fulton, an expert on the American militia movement and informant for the FBI, has far more than 170 groups on his list of "armed, violent organizations that might take a shot at the Federal Government". That's out of an estimated 1,360 "radical militias and anti-government groups" in the United States in 2012 (note that there were just 149 four years before)

"You have a lot of different people who believe the world should be different ways and once the gloves come up like they did in Iraq then all of those rise to the surface...I think depending on how far down the rabbit hole you want to go, we could end up with three or four hundred solid, different groups under probably twenty or so ideological banners."

His insurgency candidates include criminal gangs like MS-13 (more on that later!), black nationalist groups, white nationalists, sovereign citizens and generally any armed, organized group with some kind of history to it. He picked the groups he picked because they aren't flash-in-the-pan organizations, "That have enough background, in what their belief system is to carry them through that type of insurgency type activity. So if I'm a group of guys and we sit around and we hate the government, but we have no real passion for it and there's not a lot of background for us...we might go up and blow up a federal building, but we're not going to continue that on for years."

Neither of the Davids we spoke to were actually all that worried about Trump himself: can you imagine this guy directing strikes from a cave in the Adirondacks?

Brian Blanco/Getty ImagesHe'd last about three days once the military blockade cut off his supply of tanning oil.

David Kilcullen pointed out, "Most successful insurgencies are led by members of the radicalized elite...it's usually small town doctors and lawyers and local politicians and police chiefs...it's those guys...a good example would be Fidel Castro...he was an upper middle class lawyer...Mao was a school teacher...that's actually pretty common."

And Hitler was an army veteran. That brings me to the next thing we can (unfortunately) look forward to...

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2
Decades of Military Spending Will Bite Us In The Ass

Federal Bureau of Investigation

"We now have a generation, maybe up to two million people, who have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan", David Kilcullen pointed out. Most of those folks are cooks or mechanics, or in the Coast Guard, and don't know much more about fighting a war than the average Call Of Dutyplayer. But then there are Special Forces guys like these:

US Special Forces

...who look like they could overthrow a small island republic on their lunch break. What happens if one of those dudes winds up caring an awful lot about, say, White Nationalism?

This fear is a big part of why David mentioned The Management of Savagery as a likely civil war blueprint: jihadi tactics would be immediately familiar to the disaffected veterans he expects to find training our hypothetical insurgency. It's another example of the boomerang effect.

He brought up the shooting in Baton Rouge, Louisiana of three police officers by a former marine who stalked his victims before killing them:

Fox News

David pointed out that the shooter had been a data specialist and, "...the military doesn't train those guys in these techniques ... someone like me, took that guy and trained him."

When David says "someone like me", he isn't trying to sound like a badass, for most of the last few decades his job has been teaching militaries across the world how to military better. He's not just some dude gawking at a YouTube video and spitting out theories.

And Bill pointed out that, even without direct training, anyone with Internet access can pull up the full text of the Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency manual just as easily as the Army's guidelines for digging a proper poop hole. But in my lurking on militia sites, I did occasionally run into information that looked like it had its basis in something other than a manual. Take this guide to evading drones published by the Oathkeepers, an anti-government group made up of former military and police veterans.

I had a former drone operator review the video. He said their "thermal evasion suit" was based on a "decent premise", although he said it would only work well if the shooter was stationary. It's impossible to know if the info in this video came from someone with direct (albeit outdated) drone experience. In his time among America's many militias, Bill said, "...I've probably ran into direct training" of groups by military veterans, "...five or six times, in five different states. It's incredibly prevalent."

Col. Couvillon, a retired Marine, pointed out that this basic pattern is already in use by criminal organizations in the United States, "Inner-city gangs have sent people into join the military, go get combat experience, go get combat training, go get logistical training, and then they go back home and incorporate those methods in their gangs..." In 2011, the FBI noted that at least 53 different gangs had placed members in every branch of the U.S. military:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

And in the early stages of civil unrest, these groups typically find themselves recruiting every violent criminal and combat veteran they can find. These men aren't just there to be fighters, they're there to help train other people in the finer points of violence. Stathis Kalvyas, a professor at Yale and expert on civil wars, pointed out that revolutionary political groups often find themselves heavy on college graduates and light on "specialists in violence...", so they recruit "criminal types" as well as veterans who know how to operate "the kind of command and control systems that are necessary to carry out a war".

David Kilcullen, our counterinsurgency expert, agreed that young insurgent movements often bring in a lot of "street thugs" and other experienced violence-doers to "raise the temperature and get everybody used to it [violence]." Think of it as giving the Anonymous-mask-wearing masses a crash course in Bringing the Pain 101 and Fuckin' Shit Up 203.

So the longer the fighting goes on, the more insurgent groups we see crop up and the better all the fighters get at fighting. Like the war in Syria, our hypothetical civil war is only going to get bloodier the longer it goes on, in fact...

1
The Internet Will Make It Even Bloodier

LoboStudioHamburg/Pixabay

David Kilcullen literally wrote the book on counterinsurgency. And in that book he makes the point that media attention is like air to an insurgent movement. That's why, when ISIS first started expanding, they made publishing this documentary a priority :

ISIS

They also started rolling out issue after issue of their slick, glossy magazine, Dabiq, and built up a sizeable network across Twitter and other social media sites. This all translated into roughly 30,000 foreign recruits: an army of fighters who appeared because ISIS made their cause look freaking badass. Their social media game has also helped to inspire attacks, including the shooting in Orlando, at no cost to them.

Colonel Couvillon explained that on a tactical level, the existence of the Internet gave any insurgent group an incredible advantage. "...The lack of effective real time communication" was one of the hallmarks of old school guerilla groups, but "today's social media" would make coordinating a guerrilla movement "much easier".

TwitterPresenting the only people who welcome group DMs.

Social media will also make demonizing the other side (or sides) much easier. Internet access alone has been found to increase partisan hostility. And the kind of bickering people do on the Internet tends to cause a feedback loop, which makes them even angrier. We've already seen how easy social media makes it to demonize women writing fucking video games, let alone a volatile issue like politics. And Colonel Couvillon noted that, in war, "...motivation comes from patriotism or vilifying, demonizing the enemy. The Japs with monkey faces ....Charlie the Cong, ragheads, Krauts, nips, gooks..." When I asked if he thought it'd be possible to make Americans vilify other Americans in that way, he brought up the rivalries between high school football teams and said , "C'mon, it ain't hard."

And it's also possible that the sharing of pictures and videos of wartime carnage might "brutalize" some of us. Over the last few years ISIS's infamous beheading videos have inspired their followers to decapitate, or attempt to decapitate, infidels all over the world. But then beheading turned into the psychopath equivalent of a meme (also a meme?). CNN documented how it went viral worldwide among non-jihadists ...

The professor CNN interviewed, Arie Kruglanski, suggested that this might be evidence of the "brutalization effect". That term's traditionally used to refer to the well-documented phenomenon of the death penalty inspiring more violence in states that use it. But the last few years of social media makes it look like that same basic principle holds true with snapchats of atrocities. And we've got more than enough documentation of mass shootings to know that they work like a "contagion", inspiring copycat attacks usually within two weeks.

During his time in Iraq, one of David Kilcullen's jobs was to "debrief" captured insurgent fighters. He told me he'd find himself asking questions like, "How did you get to a point where you were cutting off kids heads?" And they'd always respond with something like, "I have no idea, it was like a form of collective madness that just overtook us all..." David didn't think that was all ass-covering, "...people will look back on their own behavior during the height of a civil war, and almost not recognize themselves, or recognize their behavior...and it turns out that's not accidental, there's an art to generating that."

I sincerely apologize for the nightmares all of this information is going to give you for the next month. On the upside, today is National Deep Fried Clams Day! That's ... that's enough to distract the terrified screaming in your brain, right? RIGHT?!

Robert Evans wrote a book, A Brief History of Vice, that's much more lighthearted than this article has been.

For more ways the world fundamentally misunderstands the art of war check out 5 Stupid War Myths Everyone Believes (Thanks To Movies) and 6 Things Everyone Knows About War (That Are Totally Wrong).

Subscribe to our YouTube channel to bone up on your Civil War history in How One Escaped Slave Changed The American Civil War Forever , and watch other videos you won't see on the site!

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ANS -- The Urge to Splurge Why Is It So Hard to Reduce the Pentagon Budget?

This is a really good, though biased, article on why the military budget is just going to keep going up and we are going to remain at perpetual war.  At the end there is a petition to sign, if you are so inclined.  I have a suggestion for a solution -- it's in the comments on the site.  What do you think?
Are you familiar with the Project for the New American Century?  If not, click on the link or google it and educate yourself about it.  
--Kim



The Urge to Splurge

Why Is It So Hard to Reduce the Pentagon Budget?

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SOURCETom Dispatch

Through good times and bad, regardless of what's actually happening in the world, one thing is certain: in the long run, the Pentagon budget won't go down.

It's not that that budget has never been reduced. At pivotal moments, like the end of World War II as well as war's end in Korea and Vietnam, there were indeed temporary downturns, as there was after the Cold War ended. More recently, the Budget Control Act of 2011 threw a monkey wrench into the Pentagon's plans for funding that would go ever onward and upward by putting a cap on the money Congress could pony up for it. The remarkable thing, though, is not that such moments have occurred, but how modest and short-lived they've proved to be.

Take the current budget. It's down slightly from its peak in 2011, when it reached the highest level since World War II, but this year's budget for the Pentagon and related agencies is nothing to sneeze at. It comes in at roughly $600 billion — more than the peak year of the massive arms build-up initiated by President Ronald Reagan back in the 1980s. To put this figure in perspective: despite troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan dropping sharply over the past eight years, the Obama administration has still managed to spend more on the Pentagon than the Bush administration did during its two terms in office.

What accounts for the Department of Defense's ability to keep a stranglehold on your tax dollars year after endless year?

Pillar one supporting that edifice: ideology.  As long as most Americans accept the notionthat it is the God-given mission and right of the United States to go anywhere on the planet and do more or less anything it cares to do with its military, you won't see Pentagon spending brought under real control.  Think of this as the military corollary to American exceptionalism — or just call it the doctrine of armed exceptionalism, if you will.

The second pillar supporting lavish military budgets (and this will hardly surprise you): the entrenched power of the arms lobby and its allies in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.  The strategic placement of arms production facilities and military bases in key states and Congressional districts has created an economic dependency that has saved many a flawed weapons system from being unceremoniously dumped in the trash bin of history.

Lockheed Martin, for instance, has put together a handy map of how its troubled F-35 fighter jet has created 125,000 jobs in 46 states. The actual figures are, in fact, considerably lower, but the principle holds: having subcontractors in dozens of states makes it harder for members of Congress to consider cutting or slowing down even a failed or failing program. Take as an example the M-1 tank, which the Army actually wanted to stop buying. Its plans were thwarted by the Ohio congressional delegation, which led a fight to add more M-1s to the budget in order to keep the General Dynamics production line in Lima, Ohio, up and running. In a similar fashion, prodded by the Missouri delegation, Congress added two different versions of Boeing's F-18 aircraft to the budget to keep funds flowing to that company's St. Louis area plant.

The one-two punch of an environment in which the military can do no wrong, while being outfitted for every global task imaginable, and what former Pentagon analyst Franklin "Chuck" Spinney has called "political engineering," has been a tough combination to beat.

"Scare the Hell Out of the American People"

The overwhelming consensus in favor of a "cover the globe" military strategy has been broken from time to time by popular resistance to the idea of using war as a central tool of foreign policy.  In such periods, getting Americans behind a program of feeding the military machine massive sums of money has generally required a heavy dose of fear.

For example, the last thing most Americans wanted after the devastation and hardship unleashed by World War II was to immediately put the country back on a war footing. The demobilization of millions of soldiers and a sharp cutback in weapons spending in the immediate postwar years rocked what President Dwight Eisenhower would later dub the "military-industrial complex."

As Wayne Biddle has noted in his seminal book Barons of the Sky, the U.S. aerospace industry produced an astonishing 300,000-plus military aircraft during World War II. Not surprisingly, major weapons producers struggled to survive in a peacetime environment in which government demand for their products threatened to be a tiny fraction of wartime levels.

Lockheed President Robert Gross was terrified by the potential impact of war's end on his company's business, as were many of his industry cohorts. "As long as I live," he said, "I will never forget those short, appalling weeks" of the immediate postwar period.  To be clear, Gross was appalled not by the war itself, but by the drop off in orders occasioned by its end. He elaborated in a 1947 letter to a friend: "We had one underlying element of comfort and reassurance during the war. We knew we'd get paid for anything we built.  Now we are almost entirely on our own."

The postwar doldrums in military spending that worried him so were reversed only after the American public had been fed a steady, fear-filled diet of anti-communism.  NSC-68, a secret memorandum the National Security Council prepared for President Harry Truman in April 1950, created the template for a policy based on the global "containment" of communism and grounded in a plan to encircle the Soviet Union with U.S. military forces, bases, and alliances.  This would, of course, prove to be a strikingly expensive proposition. The concluding paragraphs of that memorandum underscored exactly that point, calling for a "sustained buildup of U.S. political, economic, and military strength… [to] frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will."

Senator Arthur Vandenberg put the thrust of this new Cold War policy in far simpler terms when he bluntly advised President Truman to "scare the hell out of the American people" to win support for a $400 million aid plan for Greece and Turkey.  His suggestion would be put into effect, not just for those two countries but to generate support for what President Eisenhower would later describe as "a permanent arms establishment of vast proportions."

Industry leaders like Lockheed's Gross were poised to take advantage of such planning.  In a draft of a 1950 speech, he noted, giddily enough, that "for the first time in recorded history, one country has assumed global responsibility." Meeting that responsibility would naturally mean using air transport to deliver "huge quantities of men, food, ammunition, tanks, gasoline, oil and thousands of other articles of war to a number of widely separated places on the face of the earth."  Lockheed, of course, stood ready to heed the call.

The next major challenge to armed exceptionalism and to the further militarization of foreign policy came after the disastrous Vietnam War, which drove many Americans to question the wisdom of a policy of permanent global interventionism.  That phenomenon would be dubbedthe "Vietnam syndrome" by interventionists, as if opposition to such a military policy were a disease, not a position.  Still, that "syndrome" carried considerable, if ever-decreasing, weight for a decade and a half, despite the Pentagon's Reagan-inspired arms build-up of the 1980s.

With the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Washington decisively renewed its practice of responding to perceived foreign threats with large-scale military interventions.  That quick victory over Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait was celebrated by many hawks as the end of the Vietnam-induced malaise.  Amid victory parades and celebrations, President George H.W. Bush would enthusiastically exclaim: "And, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."

However, perhaps the biggest threat since World War II to an "arms establishment of vast proportions" came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, also in 1991.  How to mainline fear into the American public and justify Cold War levels of spending when that other superpower, the Soviet Union, the primary threat of the previous nearly half-a-century, had just evaporated and there was next to nothing threatening on the horizon?  General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up the fears of that moment within the military and the arms complex when he said, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."

In reality, he underestimated the Pentagon's ability to conjure up new threats. Military spending did indeed drop at the end of the Cold War, but the Pentagon helped staunch the bleeding relatively quickly before a "peace dividend" could be delivered to the American people. Instead, it put a firm floor under the fall by announcing what came to be known as the "rogue state" doctrine. Resources formerly aimed at the Soviet Union would now be focused on "regional hegemons" like Iraq and North Korea.

Fear, Greed, and Hubris Win the Day

After the 9/11 attacks, the rogue state doctrine morphed into the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which neoconservative pundits soon labeled "World War IV." The heightened fear campaign that went with it, in turn, helped sow the seeds for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was promoted by visions of mushroom clouds rising over American cities and a drumbeat of Bush administration claims (all false) that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda.  Some administration officials including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even suggested that Saddam was like Hitler, as if a modest-sized Middle Eastern state could somehow muster the resources to conquer the globe.

The administration's propaganda campaign would be supplemented by the work of right-wing corporate-funded think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute.  And no one should be surprised to learn that the military-industrial complex and its money, its lobbyists, and its interests were in the middle of it all.  Take Lockheed Martin Vice President Bruce Jackson, for example.  In 1997, he became a director of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and so part of a gaggle of hawks including future Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and future Vice President Dick Cheney. In those years, PNAC would advocate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as part of its project to turn the planet into an American military protectorate. Many of its members would, of course, enter the Bush administration in crucial roles and become architects of the GWOT and the invasion of Iraq.

The Afghan and Iraq wars would prove an absolute bonanza for contractors as the Pentagon budget soared. Traditional weapons suppliers like Lockheed Martin and Boeing prospered, as did private contractors like Dick Cheney's former employer, Halliburton, which made billions providing logistical support to U.S. troops in the field.  Other major beneficiaries included firms like Blackwater and DynCorp, whose employees guarded U.S. facilities and oil pipelines while training Afghan and Iraqi security forces. As much as $60 billion of the funds funneled to such contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan would be "wasted," but not from the point of view of companies for which waste could generate as much profit as a job well done. So Halliburton and its cohorts weren't complaining.

On entering the Oval Office, President Obama would ditch the term GWOT in favor of "countering violent extremism" — and then essentially settle for a no-name global war.  He would shift gears from a strategy focused on large numbers of "boots on the ground" to an emphasis on drone strikes, the use of Special Operations forces, and massive transfers of arms to U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia.  In the context of an increasingly militarized foreign policy, one might call Obama's approach "politically sustainable warfare," since it involved fewer (American) casualties and lower costs than Bush-style warfare, which peaked in Iraq at more than 160,000 troops and a comparable number of private contractors.

Recent terror attacks against Western targets from Brussels, Paris, and Nice to San Bernardino and Orlando have offered the national security state and the Obama administration the necessary fear factor that makes the case for higher Pentagon spending so palatable. This has been true despite the fact that more tanks, bombersaircraft carriers, and nuclear weapons will be useless in preventing such attacks.

The majority of what the Pentagon spends, of course, has nothing to do with fighting terrorism. But whatever it has or hasn't been called, the war against terror has proven to be a cash cow for the Pentagon and contractors like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon.

The "war budget" — money meant for the Pentagon but not included in its regular budget — has been used to add on tens of billions of dollars more. It has proven to be an effective "slush fund" for weapons and activities that have nothing to do with immediate warfighting and has been the Pentagon's preferred method for evading the caps on its budget imposed by the Budget Control Act.  A Pentagon spokesman admitted as much recently by acknowledging that more than half of the $58.8 billion war budget is being used to pay for non-war costs.

The abuse of the war budget leaves ample room in the Pentagon's main budget for items like the overpriced, underperforming F-35 combat aircraft, a plane which, at a price tag of $1.4 trillion over its lifetime, is on track to be the most expensive weapons program ever undertaken.  That slush fund is also enabling the Pentagon to spend billions of dollars in seed money as a down payment on the department's proposed $1 trillion plan to buy a new generation of nuclear-armed bombers, missiles, and submarines.  Shutting it down could force the Pentagon to do what it likes least: live within an actual budget rather continuing to push its top line ever upward.

Although rarely discussed due to the focus on Donald Trump's abominable behavior and racist rhetoric, both candidates for president are in favor of increasing Pentagon spending.  Trump's "plan" (if one can call it that) hews closely to a blueprint developed by the Heritage Foundation that, if implemented, could increase Pentagon spending by a cumulative $900 billion over the next decade.  The size of a Clinton buildup is less clear, but she has also pledged to work toward lifting the caps on the Pentagon's regular budget.  If that were done and the war fund continued to be stuffed with non-war-related items, one thing is certain: the Pentagon and its contractors will be sitting pretty.

As long as fear, greed, and hubris are the dominant factors driving Pentagon spending, no matter who is in the White House, substantial and enduring budget reductions are essentially inconceivable. A wasteful practice may be eliminated here or an unnecessary weapons system cut there, but more fundamental change would require taking on the fear factor, the doctrine of armed exceptionalism, and the way the military-industrial complex is embedded in Washington.

Only such a culture shift would allow for a clear-eyed assessment of what constitutes "defense" and how much money would be needed to provide it.  Unfortunately, the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned Americans about more than 50 years ago is alive and well, and gobbling up your tax dollars at an alarming rate.

End the U.S. Policy of Perpetual War