For those of you who are interested, here is a fairly detailed account of the big Ukrainian drone strike against Russia. Maybe it will change the course of this war?
--Kim
Zoe's Post
We have to learn from this, pronto.
CATASTROPHIC RUSSIAN STRATEGIC AVIATION LOSSES
SUMMARY: Ukraine's SBU (Intelligence Agency) launched a carefully planned, coordinated strike against Russia's strategic aviation force, principally targeting its Tu-95s and Tu-22 bombers. Initial damage assessments are that, in a single day, Ukraine has destroyed approximately 1/3 of Russia's entire strategic aviation force, in other words, probably slightly more than half of its operationally sound fleet (the remaining numbers in the fleet are parked and not currently flyable).
UPDATE
AIRCRAFT BDA (As of 2240Z)
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27 Tupolev Tu-95 "Bear"
4 Tupolev Tu-160 "Blackjack"
2 Tupolev Tu-22M2 "Blinder"
1 Beriev A-50 "Mainstay" (Russian AWACS)
2 Ilyushin Il-78 "Midas" Air Refueling Aircraft
1 Antonov An-12 "Cub" (C-130 Hercules equivalent)
4 Aircraft TBD
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"We spent over a year and a half preparing this operation. Our "office" in Russia was set up right next to a regional office of the Federal Security Service (FSB). 117 drones were used, striking 34% of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers at their airbases." — Zelensky
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OPERATIONAL DETAILS:
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1. Reportedly, "Operation Web" (or "Spider Web") was 18 months in planning and preparation by Ukraine's intelligence agency, the SBU -- all in secret without any leaks. That's extraordinary. Bear in mind that to do it again would not require another 18 months -- the technology is developed, tested, and proven; the personnel are trained and ready to do it again; the core assets are easily constructed and can be rapidly deployed. No place is safe within Russia.
2. How was it done? A series of containers and drones were smuggled into Russia via third countries and assembled there, then hauled to the target areas and driven by regular Russian truck companies who were hired for the job. The truckers were given addresses for delivery, a typical job that they often do. In this case, the destinations were near at least four and perhaps five airbases. They had no idea what they were actually delivering; they just had the cargo manifests for the containers they hauled.
3. The containers looked like regular trucking containers -- it appears that they were even filled with regular cargo loads. The tops of the containers, however, were designed to slide open on command, revealing a roughly 20 cm deep tray on top, above the cargo deck. This secret compartment for the drones was inaccessible from inside. Observably, this tray was segmented into nine rows of three drones each — 27 drones per container in all. A Starlink satellite communications system was also installed, perhaps with a back-up secondary system, which was used as a radio relay / ground-based repeater.
UPDATE: We have unconfirmed reports that the drone operators used Russia's internal cellular service towers and communications networks to control the drones — so it appears to be that the Starlink involvement is not accurate. More to come.
4. Even as the attack unfolded, Russian bystanders could do little but watch as drone after drone took off out of the tops of the containers. Local security and police forces were called in but could not scale the sides of the containers or otherwise interrupt the attack; they took to shooting at the drones as they took off and filming the circumstances (and then posting their videos on social media).
5. After take-off, the drones neede to fly only short distances to get "over the fence" and onto the airbase, which was apparently within 1 to 3 kilometers distance of where the trucks were parked up. From a drone operator's perspective, the drones were already launched from "inside the defensive perimeter". What's more, pinpoint jamming capabilities around the bases at these distant locations were minimal to non-existent. This is because FPV-type drones have ranges of between 15 and 40 km and these bases were hundreds of km and, in one case, over 4,000 km distant.
6. Given the signal lag, which was between a one- and two-second delay, the drone pilots flew their drones individually, slowly, and deliberately. One by one, a small team of drone pilots that was trained to support each container-based attack (who had been training for the mission), selected their drone, took off, and flew to the airbase, made the attack, then turned on the next drone and flew it. Once over the base and flying along the flight line, they could easily select the most high-value aircraft as their targets and choose where to hit on each -- they had trained for this specifically and knew precisely where to hit each aircraft for maximum damage.
7. An advantage of this type of operation is that there is no operational clean-up afterward, no depositioning of forward assets, and no personnel at risk of being captured. The operation was performed entirely from within Ukraine itself. In short, this was a master class in special intelligence projects, one that will go down in history as one of the greatest operations of all time.
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A-50 MAINSTAY LOSSES
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Losses in Russia's A-50 Mainstay (its AWACS equivalent) fleet are catastrophic -- reportedly, just one aircraft was hit. While that might not seem like much, Russia may only have had that one last A-50 still flyable. Furthermore, perhaps only six remain in service at all, at least three of which are parked.
IMPACT: The A-50 is a critical component in Russian strategic and tactical aviation. Many systems are designed to be integrated with their capabilities, such as the Kinzhal hypersonic missile and other systems that rely on airborne signals from the A-50s for launch, targeting, navigation, and terminal attack phases. Without an A-50, nightly Russian attacks will be reduced. Critically, Russian defensive aviation is now crippled significantly, opening the door to more forward uses of F-16s, Mirages, and MiG-29s by the Ukrainians in the coming weeks and months. Russia has ZERO industrial capacity to produce more of these aircraft; once lost, they are gone forever. The penny just dropped - big time.
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TU-95 BEAR BOMBER LOSSES
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Losses in the Tu-95 fleet are at least 27 aircraft. There were only 47 Tu-95s in service prior to the attack, so losing 27 of them is catastrophic. Perhaps only 20 remain in service now, of which, most are probably parked and not operationally capable. Many of the remaining Tu-95s are being cannibalized and will never fly again.
IMPACT: I would not be surprised if this essentially spells the end of the Tu-95 bomber in Russian service. The Tu-95 is one of two aircraft that form the backbone of Russian strategic aviation. It is the aircraft that the Russians regularly use to threaten NATO bases and even the coastlines of the USA. Losing this number of Tu-95s is irreparable. The Russians have ZERO industrial capacity to produce more of them -- once destroyed, they are gone permanently.
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TU-22 BOMBER LOSSES
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Losses in the Tu-22 fleet are not yet publicly released. My expectation, given the depth and breadth of Operational Web is that Russia may have lost between 6 and 10 of these aircraft. Prior to these losses, Russia had only 56 of these types in service. This aircraft was their supersonic bomber, the equivalent of the American B-1 Lancer.
IMPACT: The Tu-22 was used primarily for stand-off cruise missile launches. It is less capable in strategic nuclear aviation than the Tu-95, though it is sleeker and looks more lethal. It has high speed (dash) capabilities for penetrating air defense networks and hitting regional high-value targets. Realistically, it lacks the long-range capacity without repeated refueling. It lacks the proven reliability of the Tu-95 for threatening the USA with nuclear destruction. Others may disagree with this assessment, but to me the proof is in the pudding; the Russians regularly fly Tu-95 Bear missions over the North Atlantic and over the Pacific and down the Alaskan coast to Washington State; they do not regularly practice this with their Tu-22 fleet. Losing these aircraft is catastrophic as they are irreplaceable. Like the Tu-95, Russia has ZERO industrial capacity to produce more of these aircraft; once lost, they are gone forever.
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NEXT STEPS: READING TEA LEAVES
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FIRST -- EXPECT REPRISALS. Russians will probably lash out tonight with a series of intense reprisal attacks, using every ground-launched, ready rocket and missile they have in indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian cities. Ukrainians know this, however, and will prepare accordingly. We should expect hits on Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and known Ukrainian F-16 airbases. Damage will probably be limited; a nuclear attack as a response is not expected and, if Russia were stupid enough to "go there", it would result in a widening of the war with all of NATO entering the fray on a united front with an intense conventional response that would be crippling -- and might even include a "decapitation strike", which means killing Putin with a well-placed bomb. Russia's use of nuclear weapons -- even tactical nuclear weapons -- will not and cannot be tolerated. There will be an overwhelming response.
SECOND -- DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE REQUIREMENTS are lacking to recover from this. Russia has little choice now but to invest (a lot of money) into relaunching its strategic aviation production capabilities. Competing requirements against ever-dwindling budgets amidst its faltering economic situation are challenging and probably insurmountable, however. Russian industry is riddled with corruption; fixing this will take at least a decade, if ever. I would not be surprised if Putin dies of old age before these losses are replaced -- if someone doesn't kill him first. As mentioned, Russia does not have the capacity to produce replacements for ANY of the Tu-95 or Tu-22 bombers, and the A-50 that were lost. The production rate on its third strategic aviation platform, the Tu-160, is already in full swing -- however, the production rate is slow, numbering a handful of aircraft per year.
THIRD -- STRATEGICALLY, Russia has to address this -- it has no choice. The ramifications of these losses go far beyond the theatre of the Ukraine War -- this extends to its nuclear bomber force. These aircraft are the backbone of the Russian Air Force's strategic nuclear weapons delivery capability. This is the equivalent of the US losing about half of its operational B-52 and B-2 fleets (statistically, not in actual numbers). Note that, had this been done to the US strategic bomber force, the US would automatically increase its DEFCON state in response. Russia, however, has a quandary -- who does it respond against? This was entirely Ukraine's doing, though the West benefits. This pulls a good portion of the teeth of Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
FOURTH -- NO REDUNDANCY. Given that Russia's submarine-launched nuclear weapons capability is minimal and unreliable, and given these losses, Russia's nuclear deterrent is now almost exclusively its land-based missile forces in hardened bunkers. The problem is that many of those may not be functional at all -- the cost of strategic rocket forces is so high that it has attracted the worst corruption -- they go where the money is. On paper, Russia has over 4,000 nuclear warheads, however, with losses like these, it teeters on the brink of lacking a credible delivery system to conduct World War III, if that is ever contemplated. With that said, even if half of Russia's nuclear rocket forces don't work, instead of destroying the world four times over, it would only destroy the world twice over (one wonders how many nuclear warheads are actually required).
FIFTH -- POLITICALLY, this is a body blow to Russia's military, cutting deeply into Russia's ability to project power, on a global basis. This creates significant follow-on effects to Russia's global political posturing and policies. Internally, it signals a major loss of confidence in Putin, on a personal basis. However, we can expect that Putin will deflect public attention and dissent by publicly purging senior military and FSB personnel who were responsible. This further weakens Russia's political-military leadership.
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WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE WEST
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Before anyone starts celebrating, Operation Web was not simply an extraordinarily successful operation against Russia. It should serve as a wake-up call to the West. Frankly, US and NATO forces are ill-defended against this kind of attack. We're working on it, but we're not there yet. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Chinese are already flying drones by the dozens inside the USA, often near critically important military infrastructure and airbases.
ESTIMATED DAMAGES: In this one series of attacks, Ukraine has destroyed an estimated $2 Billion of critically important Russian strategic equipment -- almost all of it irreplaceable -- all in a single day.
The future ain't what it used to be.
ABOUT THOMAS VAN HARE: Thomas Van Hare is a former three-time White House appointee who worked in national security policy. These days he writes books for a living. Look him up on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0BN2932W9
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